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THE CONSTANT AND EXPANDING CLASSROOM:
SURVEILLANCE IN K-12 PUBLIC SCHOOLS*
BARBARA FEDDERS**
New technologies are expanding schools’ ability to keep students
under surveillance—inside and outside the classroom—during the
school year and after it ends. Schools have moved quickly to adopt a
dizzying array of new tools. These include digital learning products
that capture and store student data; anonymous tip lines
encouraging students to report on each other; and software that
monitors students’ emails and social media posts, even when they
are written from home. Steadily growing numbers of police officers
stationed in schools can access this information, compounding the
technologies’ power.
Advocates of these tools argue that they improve student safety and
learning outcomes, but this Article reveals that the evidence for this
argument is in fact quite thin. Moreover, policymakers have failed to
consider important countervailing considerations—most notably,
student privacy and its significance for child development; unequal
impact, particularly for poor, Black, and LGBTQ youth; and
potential liability for school administrators.
Using North Carolina’s public schools as a case study, this Article
makes three contributions to the burgeoning literature on the
surveillance state. First, it provides a comprehensive typology that
shows the full range of student surveillance. Second, it identifies key
procedural and substantive objections to student surveillance that
should be—but are not—taken into account by policymakers. Third,
it proposes principles to guide the selection, implementation, and
oversight of student surveillance.
* © 2019 Barbara Fedders.
** Assistant Professor, University of North Carolina School of Law. I wish to thank Katie
Becker, Anna Roberts, and Kathryn Sabbeth for their helpful comments and suggestions. Anne
Klinefelter and Mark Weidemaier were especially generous in sharing their time and insights. I
presented earlier versions of this Article at the Georgia State University College of Law, the
Neighborhood Criminal Law Roundtable, and in Anne Klinefelter’s “Current Issues in Privacy
Law” seminar, where I received extremely useful feedback. Katie Becker, Kyle Compton,
Rebecca Fisher, Anna Gillespie, Kisha Patel, and Lindsay Seventko provided excellent research
assistance.
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INTRODUCTION1
Today’s K-12 public-school students are under surveillance. Inside
and outside the classroom, during the school year and summer, students’
movements are tracked and their written words monitored. Schools capture
enormous amounts of student data, for which the pertinent federal and state
laws are insufficient to protect. Schools implement policies, which deputize
students to report on each other for a broad range of suspected infractions.
Moreover, they create codes of conduct that permit confiscation and, in
some cases, exploration of students’ cell phones. The number of police
officers stationed in schools continues to grow.
1. This Article references various North Carolina public-school policies on electronic
surveillance, cell phone use, and SRO usage. For a reference guide to these policies, please see
the Resource Guide to North Carolina’s Public Schools’ Electronic Surveillance, Cell Phone
Confiscation, and SRO Policies, which can be accessed at the North Carolina Law Review’s
website, https://www.northcarolinalawreview.org.
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The twin justifications for student surveillance are safety and
improved educational outcomes. 2 The companies developing these
technologies market them against a backdrop of fear of violence, especially
school shootings,3 and anxiety about academic success. State lawmakers
appear convinced by these justifications, passing legislation that mandates
adoption of some technologies and allocates funds for the purchase of
others.4 Local school districts take advantage of increased state funding to
hire school resource officers for kindergarten through the twelfth grade.5
The various mechanisms of surveillance combine to make more
information available about more students, for a longer period of time, and
accessible to a greater number of actors than was possible before the digital
age.6
North Carolina offers a case study of the mostly unexplored dangers
of the emerging student surveillance regime: here, as elsewhere, education
policymakers are adding, expanding, and enhancing surveillance methods
at a rapid pace. 7 They are doing so, both at the state and the school-district
level, without adequate consideration of significant competing substantive
and procedural issues. 8
These issues include, at a minimum, the following: first, the evidence
for efficacy of many mechanisms of surveillance is thin.9 Second, although
children’s growth and healthy development require protection of some ageappropriate degree of privacy10—including in a public school functioning
in loco parentis11—students’ privacy interests are undervalued by education
policymakers.12

2. See infra Section I.B.
3. See Sasha Abramsky, The School-Security Industry Is Cashing in Big on Fears of Mass
Shootings, THE NATION (Aug. 9, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-school-securityindustry-is-cashing-in-big-on-public-fears-of-mass-shootings/
[https://perma.cc/MT9C-7Q9N]
(“In the wake of the December 2012 Sandy Hook massacre in Newtown, Connecticut, one
company after another has rushed to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the
epidemic of fear that emerged in response to school violence, and to exploit the emotional
vulnerabilities of terrified parents.”).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 172–75.
5. See infra Section I.B.2.c.
6. See generally Julie E. Cohen, Surveillance Versus Privacy: Effects and Implications, in
THE C AMBRIDGE H ANDBOOK OF S URVEILLANCE 455, 458–59 (David Gray & Stephen E.
Henderson eds., 2017) [hereinafter Cohen, Surveillance Versus Privacy] (documenting
“emergence of pervasive, networked surveillance”).
7. See infra Section I.B.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Section II.A.
10. See John Eekelaar, The Emergence of Children’s Rights, 6 OXFORD J. LEGAL S TUD. 161,
169–70 (1986).
11. This common-law doctrine, as described in Blackstone’s Commentaries, holds:
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Third, surveillance does not always operate equitably.13 The students
most vulnerable to surveillance are from low-income families, and those
most at risk of adverse outcomes from surveillance are Black and LGBTQ
students.14 Fourth, and finally, school administrators may incur unforeseen
legal liability in hastily adopting surveillance practices that function in
violation of statutes and judicial precedent that protect student privacy
interests.15
This Article is the first in the legal literature to identify and analyze
the full extent of K-12 student surveillance. Legal scholars have raised
concerns about the negative privacy implications for students created by

[The father] may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to the tutor
or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has such a portion of the
power of the parent committed to his charge, viz. that of restraint and correction, as may
be necessary to answer the purposes for which he is employed.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, at *453. See State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. 365, 365
(1837) (“[T]he authority of the teacher is regarded as a delegation of parental authority.”).
Scholars have criticized the Supreme Court’s application of the in loco parentis doctrine in cases
involving Fourth Amendment challenges to a school’s authority, arguing that the Court uses the
doctrine only to shield schools from immunity as well as that the doctrine makes little sense as
applied to contemporary public school matters since every child is required to go to school. See,
e.g., John C. Hogan & Mortimer D. Schwartz, In Loco Parentis in the United States 1765–1985, 8
J. LEGAL H IST. 260, 267–68 (1987); Susan Stuart, In Loco Parentis in the Public Schools:
Abused, Confused, and in Need of Change, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 969, 969 (2010) (describing how
the doctrine is used by courts to “excuse violating student rights, particularly with degrading
treatment in matters of search and seizure, but with little or no concomitant recognition of any
responsibility to protect students from equally degrading treatment occasioned by sexual
harassment and bullying”); Chelsea Lauren Chicosky, Article, Restructuring the Modern
Education System in the United States: A Look at the Value of Compulsory Education Laws, 2015
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 21–23 (2015) (describing compulsory attendance laws in every state). For a
breakdown of each state’s minimum and maximum ages of required attendance, see State
Education Reforms, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT. (2017), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/
statereform/tab5_1.asp [https://perma.cc/V6NT-8USB].
12. See, e.g., Technology Responsible Use, DURHAM P UB. SCHS. BOARD EDUC.,
https://www.dpsnc.net/cms/lib/NC01911152/Centricity/domain/139/e-rate/Policy%
20Technology%20Responsible%20Use.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6BT-V25A] (“Students and
employees must understand the school system technological resources and strictly comply with
these requirements and acknowledging awareness that the school system uses monitoring systems
to monitor and detect inappropriate use of technological resources. . . . Students, employees,
visitors, and other users have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send,
delete, receive, or display when using the school system’s network, devices, Internet access email
system, or other technological resources owned or issued by the school system, whether the
resources are used at school or elsewhere.” (emphasis added)); see also infra Section II.B.
13. See Elana Zeide, Student Privacy Principles for the Age of Big Data: Moving Beyond
FERPA and FIPPS, 8 DREXEL L. REV. 339, 353 (2016) [hereinafter Zeide, Student Privacy].
14. See infra Section II.C.
15. See infra Section II.D.
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the vast array of digital learning devices used in public schools. 16 They
have also identified the costs and harms of school policing and punitive
disciplinary practices.17 Drawing from each of these bodies of scholarship, 18
this Article makes three principal contributions to the burgeoning legal
literature on the surveillance state. 19 It uncovers, in Part I, a pervasive
school surveillance regime, exploring the multiple mechanisms for
monitoring and tracking students and explaining their heretofore
unappreciated range and power. It analyzes, in Part II, the multiple
procedural and substantive objections to student surveillance that should
be—but largely are not—considered by school decisionmakers. Finally, it
proposes, in Part III, principles that should guide the selection,
implementation, and oversight of student surveillance mechanisms.
I. THE STUDENT SURVEILLANCE REGIME
This part introduces the concept of student surveillance. After a
working definition is given in Section A, Section B provides a typology
that reveals the pervasiveness and power of contemporary student
surveillance. Drawing on recent policymaking in North Carolina at the
legislative and school-district level, Section B also demonstrates how
surveillance regimes both deploy sophisticated technologies and rest on
policy choices that prioritize and facilitate constant monitoring by
administrators, school resource officers, and students themselves. Section B
further illustrates how the aims of promoting safety and improved learning
outcomes have accelerated surveillance’s development.
16. See, e.g., Susan P. Stuart, Lex-Praxis of Education Informational Privacy for Public
Schoolchildren, 84 NEB. L. REV. 1158, 1159–62 (2006) (arguing that “[p]ublic schools are
information-collection machines”); Zeide, Student Privacy, supra note 12, at 347–53.
17. See, e.g., Barbara Fedders, The Anti-Pipeline Collaborative, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
565, 566 (2016) (discussing how public school administrators increasingly borrow tactics and
terminology from the criminal system and giving, as examples, the overuse of long out-of-school
suspensions based on criminal-law concepts of retribution and deterrence, the stationing of school
police in most public middle and high schools, and the use of juvenile courts to handle quotidian
in-school misbehavior); see also Jason P. Nance, Students, Security, and Race, 63 EMORY L.J. 1,
3–7 (2013) [hereinafter Nance, Students, Security, and Race]; Jason P. Nance, Student
Surveillance, Racial Inequalities, and Implicit Racial Bias, 66 EMORY L.J. 765, 767–73 (2017);
Elizabeth A. Shaver & Janet R. Decker, Handcuffing a Third Grader? Interactions Between
School Resource Officers and Students with Disabilities, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 229, 229–32.
18. For the most part, scholars concerned about student informational privacy and those
concerned about punitive discipline and student criminalization have remained distinct. For a
notable counterexample, see Emily F. Suski, Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates: The Unprecedented
Expansion of School Surveillance Authority Under Cyberbullying Laws, 65 CASE WESTERN RES.
L. REV. 63, 63–64 (2014).
19. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN.
L. REV. 1, 1–4 (2008) (describing and defining a “National Surveillance State” and asserting that
“[t]he question is not whether we will have a surveillance state in the years to come, but what sort
of surveillance state we will have”).
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Surveillance: What Is It?

Sociologist David Lyon, a leading scholar of the interdisciplinary field
of surveillance studies, defines surveillance as “the focused, systematic and
routine attention to personal details for purposes of influence, management,
protection, or direction.”20 Foundational fictional21 and film22 treatments of
surveillance focus on its use as a tool for nation-states to maintain control
through the suppression of dissent. Contemporary surveillance, by contrast,
is distinguished by its public-private hybridity23 and its multiplicity of
purpose.24 Local, state, and federal social welfare, law enforcement, and
counter-terrorism departments and agencies rely on information
technologies created by private companies to collect, analyze, and
aggregate data about individuals. 25 They use this data for many purposes:
determining eligibility for government benefits; assessing the likelihood of
future child abuse or neglect; predicting the location and source of criminal
activity; and evaluating membership in organizations deemed hostile to
U.S. interests, to name just a few.26
Of course, surveillance does not require technology. Before the digital
age, social welfare agencies and police departments routinely placed people
under surveillance, with the burden falling disproportionately on poor
people, especially poor people of color. 27 Technology does, however,

20. DAVID LYON, S URVEILLANCE STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW 14 (2007).
21. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN E IGHTY-FOUR 3–7 (1949).
22. THE L IVES OF OTHERS (Wiedemann & Berg 2006).
23. I am indebted to Melissa Jacoby for inspiring this insight. See generally Melissa Jacoby,
Corporate Bankruptcy Hybridity, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1715 (2018) (presenting a public-private
bankruptcy model whereby bankruptcy responsibilities are allocated amongst private and public
parties in part to “improve regulatory functioning”).
24. See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1937
(2013) (describing surveillance as a routine part of the typical administrative apparatus with a
wide variety of purposes).
25. See Danielle Keats Citron & David Gray, Addressing the Harm of Total Surveillance: A
Reply to Professor Richards, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 262, 262–65 (2013),
https://harvardlawreview.org/2013/06/addressing-the-harm-of-total-surveillance-a-reply-toprofessor-neil-richards/ [https://perma.cc/DS24-3EY6].
26. VIRGINIA E UBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY 178–83 (2017).
27. See id. at 11–12. Some scholars argue that the contemporary pro-privacy movement
focuses too much on data privacy and does too little to acknowledge that the government
historically has conducted extremely invasive surveillance of marginalized populations for a wide
array of purposes, ranging from “maintaining public order to reinforcing the natural order.” Mary
Anne Franks, Democratic Surveillance, 30 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 425, 427–28 (2017). In The
Poverty of Privacy Rights, Khiara Bridges draws from eighteen months of fieldwork conducted in
a New York City medical center treating women in poverty to arrive at the sobering conclusion
that for poor women, privacy rights are more aspirational than real. See KHIARA M. BRIDGES,
THE P OVERTY OF PRIVACY R IGHTS 34–35 (2017) (theorizing that these women are deprived of
privacy rights because society presumes that they do not “possess the character that justifies
recognizing the[se] rights in the first instance”).
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enable more comprehensive surveillance of marginalized people. 28
Technology also exposes a much broader swath of the population to
surveillance29—particularly where, as in schools, it is deployed pursuant to,
and in conjunction with, policies that emphasize monitoring and control. 30
The next section explores and analyzes surveillance technologies and
policies in K-12 public schools.
B.

Typology

To fully appreciate the scope and power of contemporary student
surveillance, consider the experiences of “Manuel,” a fifteen-year-old
public-school tenth grader.31 One Saturday night, he posts a photo of
himself and a group of male friends—all Latino—on Instagram, captioning
it “Me and My Crew.” The boys are making a variety of gestures with their
hands—peace signs, thumbs-up signs, and other gestures of indeterminate
meaning. His school, which owns a third-party social media-scanning
software program, is alerted by the company that makes the program due to
what its algorithm identifies as suspicious activity. On Monday, the
assistant principal directs the school resource officer (“SRO”) to question
him about the Instagram post. Manuel explains that the photograph simply
shows him and his friends having fun. Not satisfied with that explanation,
the SRO trails him at every class exchange. The SRO also asks for and
reviews footage from the school’s video cameras from the past week. The
assistant principal alerts Manuel’s teachers that he suspects Manuel of
possible gang involvement. When Manuel sneaks a look at his cell phone
during math class, his teacher confiscates it, referencing the student code of
conduct prohibiting students from having their phones out in class. Later
Monday night, on the school-issued laptop he uses because his parents
cannot afford to buy him his own, Manuel takes a break from his
homework and emails a friend to confide that he is depressed, anxious
about the SRO, and angry at a mutual friend, Jose. Within an hour, a

28. See EUBANKS, supra note 26, at 11.
29. See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Surveillance, and Communities, 40 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 959, 960–62 (2013) (describing dramatic growth in the number of surveillance cameras in
New York City over a forty-year period and diffusion from high-crime areas to most parts of the
city).
30. See infra Section I.B.2.
31. “Manuel” is not a real child. His experiences are a composite of those of students I am
aware of from my work directing the University of North Carolina School of Law Youth Justice
Clinic as well as accounts published by companies that make software for monitoring students.
His surveillance experience is not meant to be representative of any one student’s forty-eight-hour
experience; rather, the hypothetical is intended to illustrate the range, power, and impact of
contemporary student surveillance technologies and policies.
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different SRO is at his home, alerting his parents that he is conducting a
“wellness check” because of concerns over Manuel’s email.
1. Technologies for Watching
Lyon’s definition of surveillance32—what it is comprised of and its
multiplicity of uses—offers a useful way to think about how schools watch
students in the digital age. The following subsections explain how digital
learning devices, student monitoring software, and video cameras work as
surveillance mechanisms. Additionally, each subsection explains the key
financial and legislative underpinnings for the development of these
technologies as well as the justifications often offered for their adoption or
expansion.
a.

Digital Learning and Data Capture

Digital learning refers to “any instructional practice that effectively
uses technology to strengthen a student’s learning experience.” 33 While the
most extreme version is the so-called “cyber school,”34 brick-and-mortar
schools also use a variety of digital learning devices and technologies to
supplement traditional methods of teaching and learning.35
Digital learning has exploded in the last decade. While schools with
limited financial resources may rely on “bring-your-own-device” policies,
which permit students to bring in their own devices, 36 schools increasingly
32. See LYON, supra note 20, at 14.
33. Elementary and Secondary Education Act § 4102, 20 U.S.C. § 7112(3) (Supp. V 2017).
34. Amelia A. DeGory, Note, The Jurisdictional Difficulties of Defining Charter-School
Teachers Unions Under Current Labor Law, 66 DUKE L.J. 379, 420 (2016) (describing that
“cyber school” includes students reporting to a computer lab monitored by teachers as well as
students attending classes from computers in their own home).
35. See § 7112(3). Digital learning
encompasses a wide spectrum of tools and practices, including—(A) interactive learning
resources, digital learning content (which may include openly licensed content),
software, or simulations, that engage students in academic content; (B) access to online
databases and other primary source documents; (C) the use of data and information to
personalize learning and provide targeted supplementary instruction; (D) online and
computer-based assessments; (E) learning environments that allow for rich collabo-ration
and communication, which may include student collaboration with content experts and
peers; (F) hybrid or blended learning, which occurs under direct instructor supervision at
a school or other location away from home and, at least in part, through online delivery
of instruction with some element of student control over time, place, path, or pace; and
(G) access to online course opportunities for students.
Id.
36. See Karen J. McLean, The Implementation of Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) in
Primary Schools, FRONTIERS PSYCHOL., Nov. 2016, at 1, 1; Emma Chadband, Should Schools
Embrace “Bring Your Own Device”?, NEATODAY (July 19, 2012), http://neatoday.org/2012/
07/19/should-schools-embrace-bring-your-own-device/ [https://perma.cc/3477-SDLN].
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provide their students with laptops, tablet computers, or other mobilecomputing devices. Students can use them in school and sometimes at
home, accessing such instructional material as e-textbooks and online
tutoring.37 In addition, teachers and administrators encourage parents to
supplement the school curriculum with material provided on myriad thirdparty educational applications available for no financial cost. 38
Digital learning proponents argue that the devices make teaching more
efficient and effective, learning more personalized, and communication
among parties quicker and easier. Teachers can access products that clarify
and streamline instruction and curricular development, monitor student
work for plagiarism, and assist with classroom management. 39 Students’
use of personalized learning technologies provides their teachers with
significant amounts of information about their performance—going beyond
37. See, e.g., Mike Desmond, District Providing All Buffalo School Students with Tablets,
Laptops, WBFO (Mar. 11, 2019), https://news.wbfo.org/post/district-providing-all-buffaloschool-students-tablets-laptops [https://perma.cc/VU2Z-AQ6F] (detailing Buffalo Public
Schools’ provision of laptops and tablets to students, some of whom may take the devices home);
T. Keung Hui, Wake County Distributing 52,000 New Laptops and Tablets to Schools, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/education/wake-edblog/article109160952.html [https://perma.cc/YAD4-5DFS] (detailing Wake County’s
distribution of devices and participation in Bring Your Own Device programs). While one-to-one
programs are believed essential to level the playing field for low-income students who cannot
afford to purchase their own laptops or tablets, the implementation of digital learning
technologies in school means that students must have reliable access to the internet out of
school—something that many students do not have. When schools increasingly rely on digital
learning materials to deliver material, the need for students to access the internet increases as
well. When low-income students do not have regular and reliable access to the internet, the use of
digital learning technologies can exacerbate rather than ameliorate wealth-based learning gaps.
See Rachel Monahan, What Happens When Kids Don’t Have Internet Access at Home?, THE
ATLANTIC (Dec. 12, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2014/12/whathappens-when-kids-dont-have-internet-at-home/383680/
[https://perma.cc/PU8U-ZBVN]
(quoting a Washington Public Schools Assistant Superintendent as saying “[o]nce you’ve
converted the curriculum, the material, it’s more project-based learning. You kind of need the
Internet for all those pieces to work well. If you’re not able to provide that last level of
connectivity, you’ve now widened the gap in terms of what kids can do, not to mention the
expectation around that”).
38. See Curtiss Streitelmeier, Make Parents Comfortable with Tech for a Successful 1:1
Program, EDTECH MAG. (July 30, 2018), https://edtechmagazine.com/k12/article/2018/07/makeparents-comfortable-tech-successful-11-program
[https://perma.cc/FU8E-DHJJ];
Top
Educational Apps for Kids, TALKING P ARENTS (Feb. 27, 2019), https://talkingparents.com/
blog/march-2019/top-educational-apps-for-kids [https://perma.cc/9A66-P7KK]. While these
applications may not have a financial cost, they may impose actual and potential harms on
students through their data collection and sharing practices. See, e.g., In re Google, Inc. Privacy
Policy Litig., No. C-12-01382-PSG, 2013 WL 6248499, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013)
(describing Google’s business model and noting that “[w]ith little or no revenue from its users,
Google still manages to turn a healthy profit by selling advertisements within its products that
rely in substantial part on users’ personal identification information . . . [and] in this model, the
users are the real product”); see also infra Section II.A.
39. Zeide, Student Privacy, supra note 13, at 345–48.
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just seeing a student’s performance on a particular assignment to include
metadata. A teacher can ascertain whether a student struggled to answer a
question not only by the answer provided but also by the number of times a
student logged into a system and how long she spent on a particular task. 40
Armed with this information, teachers can then presumably differentiate
their instruction by providing additional and advanced material to students
who can manage it as well as tailoring specific resources for students
working at a slower pace so that they can practice and gain mastery. 41 The
North Carolina School Superintendent of Public Instruction has argued that
personalized learning technology can lessen if not eliminate the need for
many summative assessments. 42 Finally, web-based record-keeping
platforms make accessing and communicating about grades and
disciplinary incidents easier for students, their parents, and teachers. 43
Overall, educators appear enthusiastic about digital learning. 44
While perhaps not adopted by schools for surveillance purposes,
digital learning technologies nonetheless allow for capture of significant
amounts of student data by private companies.45 Along with educational
information, a young person’s use of digital technology has the potential to

40. Elana Zeide, The Limits of Education Purpose Limitations, 71 U. MIAMI L. REV. 494,
505 (2017) [hereinafter Zeide, Limits of Education].
41. See, e.g., Heather Elliott, The Importance of Education Technology in Our Changing
World, SMARTTECH (Sept. 28, 2016), http://edblog.smarttech.com/2016/09/importanceeducation-technology-changing-world/ [https://perma.cc/XSC7-5JBJ]. But see James B. Levy,
Teaching the Digital Caveman: Rethinking the Use of Classroom Technology in Law School, 19
CHAP. L. REV. 241, 249 (2016) (expressing skepticism about educational technology generally
and specifically citing research showing a “‘remarkably consistent’ pattern extending over time in
which classroom technology is both ‘oversold and underused’” and finding a “similar pattern with
respect to teaching practices that [can be characterized as] ‘change amidst constancy,’ meaning
that even when teachers adopt new technologies, they tend to do so in ways that reinforce
established classroom practices rather than change them”(quoting L ARRY CUBAN, OVERSOLD
AND UNDERUSED: COMPUTERS IN THE C LASSROOM 130, 137, 171, 195 (2001))).
42. Email from Mark Johnson, North Carolina Superintendent of Public Instruction, to North
Carolina parents and caregivers of public-school students (Jan. 6, 2019) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
43. See, e.g., Power School, HOMEBASE: ENGAGE, CONNECT, SUPPORT, https:
homebase.ncpublicschools.gov/applications/powerschool [https://perma.cc/YT7K-F3UF] (noting
that PowerSchool is the “official student information system used statewide by the public and
charter schools of North Carolina for Storing and managing student data”); see also Jessica
Lahey, I Will Not Check My Son’s Grades Online Five Times a Day, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 6,
2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/09/i-will-not-check-my-sons-gradesonline-five-times-a-day/279385/ [https://perma.cc/NR23-98MN] (noting that seventy to eighty
percent of the schools that use PowerSchool implement the parent portal).
44. J. WILLIAM T UCKER & AMELIA VANCE, SCHOOL S URVEILLANCE: T HE C ONSEQUENCES
FOR EQUITY AND PRIVACY 3 (2016), http://www.nasbe.org/wp-content/uploads/Tucker_VanceSurveillance-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6F9-FWDZ] (citing studies showing educator
enthusiasm for digital and online learning).
45. See infra notes 49–63 and accompanying text.
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leave a data trail that can be available either while a child is a student or
later, allowing private interests to mine this data to facilitate the creation of
advertising and marketing profiles. 46 One CEO of an educational
technology company describes education as the “world’s most datamineable industry, by far.”47 The educational technology industry thus has
financial incentives to continue to offer discounted or free devices to
schools.48
While the federal and state education policy permits and encourages
digital learning, 49 regulators have not prioritized protecting student data
available to private companies after students use digital learning
technologies.50 The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”)
is the main federal statute that governs the privacy of student data. 51 The
law protects student data and regulates access to and use of education
records; it gives students and parents the right to review their education
records and to challenge misleading or inaccurate information. 52 However,
the statute is not sufficiently protective of student information given
technological advances. For example, it is unclear whether information
about students obtained pursuant to school surveillance technologies is part
of their education records.53 In addition, privacy advocates argue that
school districts can circumvent FERPA’s requirements that student data not

46. FAITH BONINGER & ALEX MOLNAR, NAT’L EDUC. POL’Y. C TR., LEARNING TO BE
WATCHED: S URVEILLANCE C ULTURE AT SCHOOL 14 (2016), https://nepc.colorado.edu/sites/
default/files/publications/RB%20Boninger-Molnar%20Trends.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F98HLBXA].
47. Id. (noting a CEO of an education technology company who boasted, “[w]e literally have
more data about our students than any company has about anybody else about anything . . . [a]nd
it’s not even close”).
48. See Meriem El-Khattabi, Mining for Success: Have Student Data Privacy and
Educational Data Mining Created a Legislative War Zone?, 2017 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y
511, 511 (noting that in 2016, one in five students had access to a school-issued Google
computing device); Zeide, Limits of Education, supra note 40, at 511–14 (discussing the value
private organizations find in collecting data from educational tools).
49. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., TOWARD A NEW GOLDEN AGE IN AMERICAN
EDUCATION 11 (2004), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED484046.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5SNW9CQ] (discussing the implementation of a national education technology plan that
acknowledges the significant role technology plays in American education).
50. See, e.g., BONINGER & MOLNAR, supra note 46, at 17 (noting that the California student
privacy law, generally considered the most student-privacy protective law in the country, does not
apply to Google applications that are not explicitly part of the Google Applications for Education
suite).
51. Jennifer C. Wasson, Recent Development, FERPA in the Age of Computer Logging:
School Discretion at the Cost of Student Privacy?, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1348, 1353 (2003).
52. Id. at 1353–54.
53. TUCKER & VANCE, supra note 44, at 13.
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be shared with third parties by “characterizing ed[ucation] tech[nology]
companies as ‘school officials.’”54
Another federal law aimed at protecting minors is the Children’s
Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”),55 which proscribes the
collection of personal information from a child under the age of thirteen
without parental consent. 56 COPPA applies to websites or online services
directed at children and any operator of these products with actual
knowledge that it is collecting personal information from a child. 57 The
statute requires operators of children’s websites to post privacy policies
outlining “what information is collected from children by the operator, how
the operator uses such information, and the operator’s disclosure practices
for such information.” 58 COPPA, too, has key weaknesses in terms of
privacy protection. For one, it only covers students under thirteen. In
addition, no private rights of action are available under this statute; instead,
the Federal Trade Commission enforces the law.59
Some states have enacted data protection laws aimed at filling in gaps
left by FERPA and COPPA. California’s law, for example—considered the
most protective of student privacy—prohibits educational technology
companies from knowingly selling student data or using it to create a
profile of the student for non-educational purposes. 60 However, even this
more robust law cannot guard against redisclosure of student data in the
event of purchases, mergers, or other acquisitions. 61 Moreover, privacy
scholars and advocates warn that even the most privacy-protective laws do

54. See, e.g., Frida Alim et al., Spying on Students: School-Issued Devices and Student
Privacy, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. 26 (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.eff.org/files/2017/
04/13/student-privacy-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/CE2P-TXL8] (noting that student privacy laws
do not apply to Google applications that are not explicitly part of the Google Applications for
Education suite).
55. Pub. L. No. 105-277, §§ 1301–1308, 112 Stat. 2681-728, 2681-728 to -735 (1998)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012)).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012).
57. Id. § 6502(b)(1)(A).
58. Id. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(i).
59. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Xanga.com to Pay $1 Million for Violating
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule (Sept. 7, 2006), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2006/09/xangacom-pay-1-million-violating-childrens-online-privacy
[https://perma.cc/DYH7-WLKB] (finding that social network website allowed and had actual
knowledge that children under thirteen were creating profiles, resulting in a settlement with the
Federal Trade Commission for $1 million).
60. The State Student Privacy Report Card, PARENT COALITION FOR S TUDENT PRIVACY 9
(Jan. 2019), https://www.studentprivacymatters.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/The-2019-StateStudent-Privacy-Report-Card.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PZ7-WQ2H].
61. Id. at 8.
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not address new technologies such as Gaggle. 62 Finally, the possibility of
widespread data breaches for students is a real one. 63
In sum, given the current inadequate regulatory regime, digital
learning technologies expose students’ personal information to a host of
public and private entities that potentially can use this data for noneducational purposes.
b.

Student Monitoring Software

As the use of digital learning technologies has become more
widespread,64 policymakers have sought to oversee and control the online
activity of minors. 65 For example, at the federal level, the Children’s
Internet Protection Act (“CIPA”) requires that schools receiving federal
funding adopt an internet security policy that keeps students from accessing
obscene visual depictions, child pornography, or images “harmful to
minors.” 66 Despite the breadth of the material that CIPA restricts—the
“harmful to minors” category is quite broad67—the statute survived68 a First
Amendment free speech challenge filed by the American Library
Association.69 In some school districts, these statutorily required filters
62. Taylor Armerding, Schools Keep Track of Students’ Online Behavior, but Do Parents
Even Know?, CSO ONLINE (Nov. 4, 2014, 4:16 AM), https://www.csoonline.com/
article/2841969/big-data-security/schools-keep-track-of-students-online-behavior-but-do-parentseven-know.html [https://perma.cc/89XT-6DTF]; see infra Section I.B.1.b.i.
63. See generally JOSEPHINE WOLFF, YOU’LL SEE T HIS MESSAGE WHEN IT IS TOO L ATE:
THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC AFTERMATH OF CYBERSECURITY BREACHES (2018) (discussing the
frequency and ease of electronic data breaches). One North Carolina commentator notes, referring
to student data stored online, “[t]hey always say this stuff is protected, but probably a student
could hack it.” Telephone Interview by Katie Becker with Janine Murphy, Representative, N.C.
Sch. Bd. Ass’n (Feb. 20, 2019).
64. See supra Section I.B.1.a.
65. See Enrique Dans, Surveillance in Schools: Where is This Taking Us?, FORBES (Aug. 23,
2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/enriquedans/2018/08/23/surveillance-in-schools-where-isthis-taking-us/ [https://perma.cc/K4ZE-L57H] (surveying legislative developments and
concluding that “[s]igns are, we’re headed toward a scenario where students will be permanently
under surveillance by cameras, algorithms and all kinds of technologies designed to not only to
[sic] monitor their movements, but what they’re thinking”).
66. 20 U.S.C. § 9134 (f)(1)(a) (2012).
67. See generally JUDITH LEVINE, HARMFUL TO MINORS: T HE PERILS OF PROTECTING
CHILDREN FROM SEX 3–19 (2002) (arguing that “harmful to minors” nomenclature typically
constitutes an umbrella term for censorship).
68. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 214 (2003) (“Because public
libraries’ use of Internet filtering software does not violate their patrons’ First Amendment rights,
CIPA does not induce libraries to violate the Constitution, and is a valid exercise of Congress’
spending power.”). Shielding students from “indecent, lewd,” or “sexually suggestive speech”
was found to be within schools’ constitutionally permissible activities because schools’ mission is
to “inculcat[e] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political
system.” Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 678, 681, 694 (1986).
69. See Judith F. Krug, The Aftermath of the Children’s Internet Protection Act, INSIGHTS
ON L. & SOC’Y, Winter 2004, at 1 (noting that the American Library Association had opposed
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travel with students when they bring their school-issued computers home,
thus broadening the geographical scope of the school’s control of students’
online activity.70
Another example of policymakers’ preoccupation with internet
oversight can be found at the school-district level. Many districts have
policies advising that all work on the internet and with digital devices is
subject to school monitoring, whether or not the work is done in school.71
One district’s policy is sweeping both in terms of what it covers and to
whom it applies:
Students and employees must understand the school system
technological resources and strictly comply with these requirements
and acknowledging awareness that the school system uses
monitoring systems to monitor and detect inappropriate use of
technological resources . . . . Students, employees, visitors, and other
users have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store,
send, delete, receive, or display when using the school system’s
network, devices, Internet access email system, or other
technological resources owned or issued by the school system,
whether the resources are used at school or elsewhere, and even if
the use is for personal purposes.72
In addition to CIPA and district-level policies that provide for
monitoring students in their use of technology, third-party software
packages permit school districts to move beyond merely protecting students
from online material deemed to be harmful. 73 Districts that opt to use these
software packages can gain access to a wide swath of student-created
content, covering an expanded amount of time. 74 The following sections
discuss two such products.

CIPA because it viewed filters as over- and under-inclusive to the stated goals of the act and
because of the equity implications of the Act—the millions of low-income people who must rely
on a library for Internet access miss much of what is available to people who can afford to pay).
70. Audrey Watters, When Schools’ Internet Filters Follow You Home, HACKED EDUC.
(May 7, 2012), https://hackeducation.com/2012/05/07/when-school-internet-filters-follow-youhome-cipa [https://perma.cc/6F65-RZQK].
71. See, e.g., supra note 12 and accompanying text.
72. Technology Responsible Use, supra note 12; see also CHCCS Policy Code: 3225
Computer, Network, and Internet Usage, CHAPEL H ILL-C ARRBORO CITY SCHS. (2010),
https://sites.google.com/site/educationcollaboration/guidelines/chccs
[https://perma.cc/V8SQXUU8] (“[T]here is no privacy. Schools can monitor, check, and capture student input.”).
73. See infra Section I.B.1.b.
74. See infra Section I.B.1.b; see also LYON, supra note 20, at 14 (noting that surveillance is
“not random, occasional, or spontaneous”).
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i. Safety Management Platforms
Schools that wish to easily and efficiently monitor student-created
content on school-issued computers and transmitted over school internet
servers have the option of using so-called safety management platforms.
These programs use natural-language processing to sift through the
millions of words typed by students. 75 One such platform is Gaggle;
schools that purchase this product obtain the software along with access to
a team of off-site “security specialists” trained to look for an unspecified
group of words deemed troubling. 76 When, as in the case of Manuel, they
are alerted that students have typed such words, company representatives
contact the school, and, in some cases, law enforcement. 77 School officials
and law enforcement can, and do, in turn notify the student’s parents and
sometimes visit the student’s home in-person.78
Schools may justify the use of safety management platforms by
referencing the need to detect any or all of the following: signs of intent to
commit self-harm, indications of intent to commit violence, and verbal
harassment that rises to the level of cyberbullying.
Consider first the argument about the need to detect student intent to
commit self-harm.79 Rates of depression and anxiety among young people
have soared in recent years,80 as has the number of students engaging in

75. See Simone Stolzoff, Schools are Using AI to Track What Students Write on Their
Computers, QUARTZ (Aug. 19, 2018), https://qz.com/1318758/schools-are-using-ai-to-trackwhat-students-write-on-their-computers/ [https://perma.cc/5F7R-BTHG]; see also Dans, supra
note 65 (describing development of artificial intelligence methods to track what students are
doing and predictive algorithms to analyze the probability of negative student outcomes,
including dropping out, and noting that these developments are “driven by policies that support
the virtually unlimited collection of student data from the earliest stages”).
76. Corey Tutewiler, Discipline vs. Teachable Moments: Defined, GAGGLE,
https://www.gaggle.net/speaks/discipline-vs-teachable-moments-defined/
[https://perma.cc/
M7F5-HMWG].
77. Id.
78. See Press Release, Educ. Writers Ass’n, A Growing Number of Districts are Selecting
Gaggle’s School Safety Solutions to Protect Their Students (Feb. 6, 2019),
https://www.ewa.org/press-release/growing-number-districts-are-selecting-gaggles-school-safetysolutions-protect-their [https://perma.cc/U524-UL5J] (describing the notification process by
which Gaggle notifies administrators and parents when student activity is flagged); Wassau
School
District:
The
Priceless
Value
of
a
Student’s
Life,
GAGGLE,
https://www.gaggle.net/success-stories/wausau-school-district [https://perma.cc/M8BX-TWXG]
(discussing suicide-prevention tactics of performing home “wellness checks” on students whose
online communications are flagged).
79. See Press Release, Educ. Writers Ass’n, supra note 78 (describing how Gaggle helped to
prevent student suicide in the schools where it is used and listing “partner districts” from around
the country).
80. See, e.g., Laurence Steinberg, Anxiety and Depression in Adolescence, CHILDMIND
INST.
(2017),
https://childmind.org/report/2017-childrens-mental-health-report/anxietydepression-adolescence [https://perma.cc/E4YJ-39LG] (noting that anxiety and depression are on
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self-harm that results in a hospital visit. 81 Between 2007 and 2014, the
suicide rate among middle-school youth doubled. 82
Along with concern about the potentially self-harming student herself,
educators might justify the purchase and use of Gaggle by pointing to
evidence that a self-harm history correlates with violent acts against others;
one study showed that sixty-one percent of school assailants had a history
of suicide attempts. 83
While school shootings are extremely rare,84 they dominate school
safety planning. 85 Along with contracting with security companies for the
installation of “hard target” mechanisms—bullet-proof glass, door locks,
metal detectors, and the like86—school violence prevention efforts also
often include so-called “threat assessments” of students. These are
undertaken after a student has committed a serious or violent infraction in
order to help the school determine the appropriate response and

the rise and that high school students have more anxiety symptoms and are twice as likely to see a
mental health professional as teens in the 1980s).
81. Melissa C. Mercado et al., Trends in Emergency Department Visits for Nonfatal SelfInflicted Injuries Among Youth, 318 JAMA 1931, 1931 (2017). Girls and transgender youth are
particularly vulnerable. Id.; see Claire M. Peterson et al., Suicidality, Self-Harm, and Body
Dissatisfaction in Transgender Adolescents and Emerging Adults with Gender Dysphoria, 47
SUICIDE & L IFE-T HREATENING BEHAV. 475, 475 (2017) (noting a study showing that
approximately thirty percent of transgender youth report a history of at least one suicide attempt,
and nearly forty-two percent report a history of self-injury, such as cutting).
82. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, QuickStats: Death Rates for Motor Vehicle
Traffic Injury, Suicide, and Homicide Among Children and Adolescents Aged 10–14 Years—
United States, 1999–2014, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. (Nov. 4, 2016),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/wr/mm6543a8.htm?s_cid=mm6543a8_w
[https://perma.cc/83A8-2FPG].
83. See Allison Paolini, School Shootings and Student Mental Health: Role of the School
Counselor in Mitigating Violence, VISTAS ONLINE, 1, 3 (2015), https://www.counseling.org/
docs/default-source/vistas/school-shootings-and-student-mental-health.pdf?sfvrsn=f2db432c_6
[https://perma.cc/CW7Y-TJQC].
84. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Miller v. Alabama and the (Past and) Future Regulation of
Juvenile Crime, 31 LAW & INEQ. 535, 541 (2013) (noting that “children face a greater risk of
being struck by lightning” than being shot in school); see also Abramsky, supra note 2
(discussing the rarity of school violence).
85. Matthew T. Theriot, School Resource Officers and the Criminalization of Student
Behavior, 37 J. CRIM. JUST. 280, 280 (2009) (“Though contrary to statistics showing that school
crime nationally was declining, relatively rare, and usually nonviolent, school shootings fed
growing public fear of juvenile and school crime.” (citation omitted)); see also Kate Stringer,
American Schools Are Safer Than Ever, but Annual Education Poll Reveals 1 in 3 Parents Now
Fear That Their Children are in Danger on Daily Basis, 74 MILLION (July 17, 2018),
https://www.the74million.org/article/american-schools-are-safer-than-ever-but-annual-educationpoll-reveals-one-in-three-parents-now-fear-their-children-are-in-danger-on-daily-basis/
[https://perma.cc/Z896-5YDM] (chronicling parental fears about school safety).
86. See Mark Keierleber, School-Security Companies Are Thriving in the Era of Mass
Shootings, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/
archive/2018/08/school-security-mass-shootings/567080/ [https://perma.cc/DYP3-VVAZ].
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disciplinary decision. 87 Accurately predicting the commission of future
violent behavior is “almost impossible,” and the FBI cautions against trying
to do so.88 Nonetheless, schools are keen to obtain any data that would help
them prevent violence, especially a shooting, and so they seek any and all
clues that students’ words might provide. 89 Products like Gaggle make the
search for clues easier.90
Finally, safety management platforms may reveal what administrators
believe to be not only indicators of self-harm or intention to commit
violence but also suggestions of verbal harassment or bullying of other
students. Like other states, North Carolina requires school districts to adopt
a policy prohibiting bullying or harassing behavior;91 cyberbullying92 is
included in many such policies. 93 According to one study, seventy-two
percent of internet users between the ages of twelve and seventeen reported
at least one instance of cyberbullying. 94
87. See Threat Assessments for School Administrators & Crisis Teams, NASP (2015),
https://www.nasponline.org/resources-and-publications/resources-and-podcasts/school-climatesafety-and-crisis/systems-level-prevention/threat-assessment-at-school/threat-assessment-forschool-administrators-and-crisis-teams [https://perma.cc/T9R6-S3J6] (describing three-part
process of identifying student threats to commit a violent act, determining the seriousness of the
threat, and developing intervention plans that protect potential victims and address underlying
problems).
88. See MARY E LLEN O’TOOLE, NAT’L. C TR. FOR THE ANALYSIS OF VIOLENT CRIME, FED.
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION ACAD., THE SCHOOL S HOOTER: A THREAT ASSESSMENT
PERSPECTIVE 2–3 (2009).
89. See Can Artificial Intelligence Prevent School Violence?, INST. E LECTRICAL &
ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS (2019), https://innovationatwork.ieee.org/can-artificial-intelligenceprevent-school-violence [https://perma.cc/8C6T-PSKE] (quoting Gaggle executive claiming
“[s]tudies have shown that kids communicate before a violent act happens and they will
communicate electronically. If you don’t have the means to hear those cries out for help you’re
going to have children in jeopardy”).
90. Gaggle is not the only such product. See id. for a discussion of other products that make
use of artificial intelligence to enable schools to search content created by students.
91. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-407.15 to .16 (2017).
92. David D. Luxton, Jennifer D. June & Jonathan M. Fairall, Social Media and Suicide: A
Public Health Perspective, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH (S UPP. 2), 195, 196 (2012) (defining
cyberbullying as the targeting of a child or teen through threats, harassment, and humiliation, by
means of technologies such as e-mail, messaging applications, texting, or social networking sites
and stating this behavior as only constituting cyberbullying if it is repeated and intentional).
Despite the fact that academics may define cyberbullying as requiring repetition, many states
punish single instances. For example, in North Carolina, cyberbullying is a misdemeanor offense
and does not require any repetition. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.1(b) (2017).
93. See, e.g., Policy Code 3226/4205 Internet Safety, WAKE C TY. PUB. SCH. SYS. (Oct. 4,
2016),
https://boardpolicyonline.com/bl/?b=wake_new&s=208219#&&hs=194199
[https://perma.cc/2ANG-AYVV].
94. Suski, supra note 18, at 66–67. “[F]orty-six states and the District of Columbia now have
laws prohibiting cyberbullying.” Id. at 66. These states range in terms of the ways in which they
define bullying—some require repeated acts, whereas many, like North Carolina, consider a
single proscribed act to constitute bullying—as well as whether they require the bullying activity
to have a nexus to the school environment. Id. at 70–72.
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Three features of the internet appear to work together to explain the
frequency of cyberbullying reports among young people.95 First, the
expectation of anonymity that users have when accessing the internet frees
them to be bolder 96—and sometimes crueler97—versions of themselves than
they would be offline. The immediate social repercussions that typically
attend a negative in-person interaction are absent in cyberspace. 98 Second,
unlike comments and letters, internet posts are often permanent. 99 Third,
networked technologies exponentially expand the audience of a hateful
post. Just as the internet facilitates student collaboration on schoolwork,100
so too might it fuel the formation of collectives of destructive behavior. 101
ii. Social Media Scanning Software
Another way that schools monitor student-created content is through
the use of products that scan students’ public social media postings,
whether or not the postings are made using the devices or on-site school
internet servers.
One such product is Social Sentinel. 102 Created by a former law
enforcement officer, this product scans multiple social media platforms,
searching students’ words, images, and videos.103 The platform is “powered
by proven machine learning and artificial intelligence logic,” which the
company argues can allow it to sort through postings to accurately
determine threats requiring immediate action as well as “insights for a
broader context, leading to a greater understanding.”104 Manuel’s Instagram
95. See DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 4–5 (2014) (“The Internet
extends the life of destructive posts . . . [n]etworked technologies exponentially expand the
audience for cyberharassment.”).
96. Id. at 57 (“Anonymity can bring out our worst behavior . . . [and] can nudge us to do
terrible things.”).
97. See Eric Y. Drogin et al., Psycholegal Aspects of Cyberbullying: The Dark Side of Social
Networking, ABA SCITECH L., Spring 2012, at 5.
98. Id.
99. See CITRON, supra note 95, at 4 (noting that posts have no “built-in expiration dates”
and “[s]earch engines produce results with links to destructive posts from years earlier”).
100. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
101. CITRON, supra note 95, at 62 (“The hoods of the Ku Klux Klan were key to the
formation of mobs responsible for the death of African Americans. In our time, anonymity has
encouraged the formation of destructive cyber mobs . . . .”); see CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
REPUBLIC.COM 2.0, at 55 (2007) (explaining that when groups with similar views get together,
their members hear “more and louder echoes of their own voices”).
102. Our
Platform,
SOC.
SENTINEL,
https://www.socialsentinel.com/platform
[https://perma.cc/2HUD-GSXP].
103. Social Sentinel Adds Integration with Gmail, Image Recognition and an Anonymous
Sharing Platform to its Suite of Products, SOC. SENTINEL (Mar. 28, 2019),
https://www.socialsentinel.com/post/social-sentinel-product-release-announcement
[https://perma.cc/5MKD-LDDX].
104. Our Platform, supra note 102.
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post presumably would fall into the category not of an emergent threat but
that of “insights for a [broader] context.” 105
Because they scan all students’ public posts, Social Sentinel and
similar products may be less likely to generate controversy than more
targeted—and duplicitous—online tactics of school administrators
targeting students’ private posts.106 In the past, at least one administrator
engaged in trickery—creating fake social media accounts through which
she could become “friends” with students and get access to their private
postings.107
Currently only twenty percent of North Carolina districts publicize
that they are using Gaggle, 108 others note that they use social media
scanning software.109 The popularity and decreasing cost of educational
technology suggest that the number of districts that use safety management
platforms and social media scanning software will likely increase. 110
Indeed, school districts can apply for funding from a general safety setaside program through the state Department of Public Instruction. 111

105. Id. For a discussion of how artificial intelligence can reinforce racial and other forms of
bias, see, for example, Karen Hao, This is How AI Bias Really Happens—And Why It’s So Hard
to Fix, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 4, 2010), https://www.technologyreview.com
[https://perma.cc/D6ZM-MU5M]. For further discussion of how surveillance technologies
operate inequitably, see infra Section II.C.
106. See Somini Sengupta, Warily, Schools Watch Students on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
28, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/29/technology/some-schools-extend-surveillanceof-students-beyond-campus.html [https://perma.cc/TG3Q-7LZX (dark archive)] (documenting
case of Missouri principal who resigned amid accusations that she had spied on students using
fake social media accounts).
107. Id.
108. See Resource Guide discussed supra note 1; see also Bring Your Own Technology
Initiative Lights Up Classroom, CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG SCH. (Dec. 5, 2012),
http://www.cms.k12.nc.us/News/Pages/BringYourOwnTechnologyinitiativelightsup.aspx
[https://perma.cc/9X5D-V5QR]. It is possible that school districts are employing this and other
technologies without notifying the public that they are doing so. For a critique of this absence of
transparency, see infra Section III.B.
109. Derrick Lewis, Orange County Schools Implementing Social-Media Monitoring for
Students, CBS 17 (June 28, 2018), https://www.cbs17.com/news/local-news/orange-countynews/orange-county-schools-implementing-social-media-monitoring-for-students/1269571066
[https://perma.cc/ND6K-8VSL].
110. See supra Section I.B.1a.
111. Current Operations Appropriations Act of 2018, ch. 5, § 7.27(a)-(b), (h), 2018-2 N.C.
Adv. Legis. Serv. 1, 33 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-105.51) (creating
grant for “Safety Equipment”); see 2018–2019 School Safety Grants School Safety Equipment
Grant Application, N.C. DEP’T P UB. INSTRUCTION (2018), http://www.dpi.state.nc.us/
docs/cfss/home/equipment-application.pdf
[https://perma.cc/85XM-LU95]
(defining
“[s]urveillance equipment and cameras” as an “[a]llowable [e]xpense[]” under the school safety
equipment grant program).
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Video Cameras

Nationwide, the overwhelming majority of schools use security video
cameras to monitor students. 112 Cameras are increasing in sophistication.
Most of the schools that use cameras also have recording systems. 113 Until
recently, real-time monitoring of cameras was not feasible because it was
expensive and inefficient. 114 Now, however, some surveillance cameras
have cloud-based storage, which means that administrators can use a
browser-based dashboard to view a video feed on their computer or phone,
enabling people off campus to monitor in real time what is happening on
campus.115 In addition, school districts have, or may soon be equipped with,
face recognition software. 116
Cameras are typically stationed throughout the school—in the
cafeteria, entrances, hallways, and sometimes even in classrooms. 117 The
only places in schools where they consistently do not appear are bathrooms
and locker rooms.118

112. See Fast Facts: School Safety and Security Measures, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT.,
https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=334 [https://perma.cc/HRU7-UYT3] (reporting that
seventy-three percent of elementary schools, eighty-nine percent of middle schools, and ninetyfour percent of high schools “use security cameras to monitor the school”).
113. Bryan R. Warnick, Surveillance Cameras in Schools: An Ethical Analysis, 77 HARV.
EDUC. REV. 317, 319 (2007).
114. See id.
115. Dan Tynan, Digital Surveillance Systems Help Keep K-12 Students, Staff Safe from
Harm, EDTECH MAG. (Apr. 3, 2018), https://edtechmagazine.com/k12/article/2018/04/digitalsurveillance-systems-help-keep-k-12-students-staff-safe-harm
[https://perma.cc/7LQQ-7HP9]
(noting that an additional perceived advantage is that these cameras consume less network
bandwidth than “traditional IP cameras”).
116. See Ava Kofman, Face Recognition is Now Being Used in Schools, but It Won’t Stop
Mass
Shootings,
THE
INTERCEPT
(May
30,
2018,
12:36
PM),
https://theintercept.com/2018/05/30/face-recognition-schools-school-shootings/ [https://perma.cc/
EDT7-9P9D]; see also Tom Cheshire, 25 Big Ideas for 2012: Ubiquitous Face Recognition,
WIRED (Jan. 9, 2012, 9:22 AM), http://www.wired.com/business/2012/01/ubiquitous-facerecognition [https://perma.cc/LY56-JNEA] (noting concerns over face recognition technology
“mission creep” and quoting a security technology expert as saying that “[r]ecognizing people in
photographs works well, . . . [b]ut attempts to pick terrorists out of crowds have failed, resulting
in systems that do a great job surveilling innocents and a terrible job identifying the guilty”).
117. See Warnick, supra note 113, at 319.
118. Id.; see infra notes 300–04 and accompanying text (discussing case law regarding
reasonable expectations of privacy and video cameras); see also Privacy in Education: Guide for
Parents and Adult-Age Students, PRIVACY RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE (July 1, 2015),
https://www.privacyrights.org/consumer-guides/privacy-education-guide-parents-and-adult-agestudents [https://perma.cc/39RY-WDLY]. When an individual “seeks to preserve [something] as
private,” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967), and his expectation of privacy is “one
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable,’” the Court has held that official intrusion
into that private sphere generally qualifies as a search and requires a warrant supported by
probable cause. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Changing rooms and bathrooms, at
least for now, are locations in schools in which students have expectations of privacy that courts
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The justification often given for video cameras is that they deter
student misbehavior—fighting, drug or alcohol use or distribution, as well
as less serious infractions—through promoting student self-monitoring.119
Under this theory, simply by knowing they are being recorded—and
potentially observed—students will refrain from engaging in misbehavior.
In addition, video footage can aid in after-incident investigation by
administrators to determine student involvement and culpability. It can be
incriminating or exculpatory, serving as evidence in school discipline
proceedings and criminal prosecutions.
During the 1999–2000 school year, nineteen percent of public schools
were equipped with security cameras; by the 2015–16 school year, eightyone percent of schools had them. 120 Their popularity may derive in part
from their unobtrusiveness relative to other forms of security—metal
detectors, and drug-sniffing dogs, for example. 121 It is also the case that
multiple funding sources for new and improved cameras are available. In
North Carolina, school districts can apply for funding to install or upgrade
video cameras.122 In addition, surveillance technology companies have
begun offering face-recognition software for free to school districts. 123
2. Policies for Monitoring and Control
Along with using technologies that capture significant amounts of
student data, scanning content created by students both in and out of
recognize as reasonable. See, e.g., Brannum v. Overton Cty. Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489, 492, 496
(6th Cir. 2008).
119. See, e.g., Lynn A. Addington, Cops and Cameras: Public School Security as a Policy
Response to Columbine, 52 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1426, 1431 (2009) (documenting use of
webcams in hallways and classrooms for, inter alia, deterrence of criminal activity); Mitchell L.
Yell & Michael E. Rozalski, Searching for Safe Schools: Legal Issues in the Prevention of School
Violence, 8 J. EMOTIONAL & BEHAV. D ISORDERS 187. 193 (2000) (noting deterrence value of
surveillance cameras); see also Brannum, 516 F.3d at 492, 496 (noting in a case challenging the
placement of video cameras in middle school locker rooms that the school had argued that
cameras were necessary to improve school security).
120. NAT’L C TR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME & S AFETY 2017, at
viii (2018), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2018/2018036.pdf [https://perma.cc/KE5Q-Z5U4].
121. Id. at 114, 120.
122. Current Operations Appropriations Act of 2018, ch. 5, § 7.27(a)–(b), (h), 2018-2 N.C.
Adv. Legis. Serv. 1, 33 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-105.51) (creating
grant for “Safety Equipment”); see also 2018–2019 School Safety Grants School Safety
Equipment Grant Application, supra note 111 (defining “[s]urveillance equipment and cameras”
as an “[a]llowable [e]xpense[]” under the school safety equipment grant program).
123. Eli Zimmerman, Company Offers Free Facial Recognition Software to Boost School
Security, EDTECH MAG. (Aug. 3, 2018), https://edtechmagazine.com/k12/article/
2018/08/company-offers-free-facial-recognition-software-boost-school-security [https://perma.cc/
AKS3-5DM6]. Underfunded schools are uniquely susceptible to offers of free devices and
educational software from large educational technology companies. See BONINGER & MOLNAR,
supra note 46, at 25.
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school, and tracking students’ actions while in the hallways and sometimes
the classroom, schools create policies and administer programs that
emphasize monitoring and control. Schools use anonymous tip lines, which
enable administrators to expand their pool of knowledge about student
behavior by deputizing students to report on each other.124 In addition,
codes of conduct that provide for confiscation of student cell phones can
lead to investigation of a phone’s contents that may disclose details about a
student she may wish to keep private, such as her friends’ names and
contents of their correspondence. 125 What is more, SRO are provided with,
or affirmatively seek, data obtained from surveillance technologies and use
it to conduct investigations of children both at school and in students’
homes. Information obtained through technologies and monitoring policies
expands the power and capacity of SRO. Various policies for monitoring
and control are discussed below.
a.

Anonymous Tip Lines

As of the 2019–20 school year, every North Carolina local school
administrative unit will be required to develop and operate a confidential,
anonymous tip line. 126 These tip lines permit and encourage students to
anonymously report each other for a wide range of percieved
misconduct.127
The justification underlying the adoption of these tip lines is similar to
that which motivates student monitoring software, namely, the belief that
students share their plans to commit self-harm or to harm others with their
peers in advance.128 The hope is that the anonymity feature of the tip lines
will encourage those peers to in turn share the information they are given
with administrators.129 The tip lines accept reports in a broad range of
categories that might suggest a student constitutes a risk.130 One district tip
line’s drop-down menu, for example, includes subjective categories such as

124. See infra Section I.B.2.a.
125. See infra Section I.B.2.b.
126. Current Operations Appropriations Act of 2018, ch. 5, § 7.26(a), 2018-2 N.C. Adv.
Legis. Serv. 1, 33 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-105.51).
127. See Press Release, Pub. Sch. of N.C., State Superintendent Mark Johnson Declares
September
School
Safety
Month
in
North
Carolina
(Sept.
4,
2018),
http://www.ncpublicschools.org/newsroom/news/2018-19/20180904-01 [https://perma.cc/QL2PXJ89].
128. Evie Blad, More Schools Are Using Anonymous Tip Lines to Thwart Violence. Do They
Work?, EDWEEK (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2018/08/10/moreschools-are-using-anonymous-tip-lines.html [https://perma.cc/U5YL-QQUU].
129. Id.
130. Anonymous TipLine, CHAPEL H ILL-C ARRBORO CITY SCH., https://www.chccs.org/
Page/9633 [https://perma.cc/43GW-9H2E].
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“personal crisis” and “isolation,” along with the perhaps more obvious
category of “danger to others.” 131
The North Carolina General Assembly in 2018 allocated $5 million to
fund these tip lines for all grades six or higher. 132 Federal funding for tip
lines is also available pursuant to the 2018 STOP Violence Act.133
b.

Technology Confiscation Provisions

Many North Carolina public schools have provisions in their student
codes of conduct that regulate the possession and use of technology,
including cell phones, that students bring to school. 134 Most schools allow
students to bring devices to school—perhaps as a concession to the fact that
students own cell phones at increasingly younger ages135—but prohibit
them from turning them on unless specifically authorized by a teacher. 136
When a student violates the prohibition on activating devices, school
personnel may seize them. 137 Disciplinary consequences may follow, such
as when a school determines that the phone was used to cheat on a test or
send an inappropriate text to another student. 138 In many cases, once
confiscated, a phone or other device will be held by the school until a
parent appears at the school to obtain it. 139
131. Id.
132. Press Release, Pub. Sch. of N.C., supra note 127.
133. Andrew Ujifusa, House Passes STOP School Violence Act One Month After Parkland
Shooting,
EDWEEK
(Mar.
14,
2018),
https://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaignk-12/2018/03/house_passes_STOP_school_violence_act_one_month_parkland_shooting.html
[https://perma.cc/N4TW-VNLP].
134. See, e.g., Policy 4318: Use of Wireless Communication Devices, BLADEN CTY. SCHS.,
https://boardpolicyonline.com/?b=bladen&s=141051 [https://perma.cc/4WMD-9N8W] (stating
that “school employees may immediately confiscate any wireless communication devices that are
on, used, displayed or visible in violation of this policy” and that “confiscated wireless
communication devices will be returned only to the student’s parents”).
135. Monica Anderson, Teens, Social Media & Technology 2018, PEW RES. CTR. (May 31,
2018),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/05/31/teens-social-media-technology-2018
[https://perma.cc/DGC3-5C2M] (noting that ninety-five percent of teens in a 2018 study stated
that they have a smartphone or access to one); see Delaney Ruston, Andrew Orlebeke & Talia
Friedman, Survey Reveals That the Majority of U.S. Middle Schools Allow Students to Carry Cell
Phones
Throughout
the
School
Day,
SCREENAGER
(Dec.
13,
2017)
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5a69fe629f8dce3218418fe2/t/5a8ee7be652deaae30b8eb23/
1519314881193/CPC+Survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DQK-W679] (noting that the average age at
which youths get their first smartphone currently is 10.3 years old).
136. See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Policy Code 4318: Use of Wireless Communication Devices, ALEXANDER
CTY.
SCHS.,
https://www.boardpolicyonline.com/bl/?b=alexander#&&hs=364298
[https://perma.cc/HE6D-Z33R].
138. Id.
139. Id. (authorizing students to have phones at school as long as they are not “activated,
used, displayed or visible during the instructional day or as otherwise directed by school rules or
school personnel” and noting that “[t]eachers and administrators may authorize students to use the
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While not explicitly articulated by school districts, the justification for
these confiscation provisions is likely the evidence that students frequently
use their phones in school without authorization,140 and that this use
distracts students from learning141 and instructors from teaching. 142
A second way in which students may lose temporary—and sometimes
permanent—possession of their cell phones in schools is that phones may
be seized pursuant to a search warrant 143 as evidence of a crime or in

device for instructional purposes,” and establishing as consequences that phones may
immediately be confiscated if “on, used, displayed, or visible” and noting further that they “will
be returned only to a student’s parent,” and establishing that the five factors to be considered in
determining appropriate consequences are whether the phone was used to: “reproduce images of
tests, obtain unauthorized access to school information or assist students in any aspect of the
instructional program in a manner that violates any school board policy, administrative regulation
or school rule; bully or harass other students; send illicit text messages; take and/or send illicit
photographs; or in any other manner that would make more severe disciplinary consequences
appropriate”). For a list of all North Carolina districts’ technology confiscation provisions, see
Resource Guide discussed supra note 1.
140. See, e.g., Amanda Lenhart et al., Teens and Mobile Phones, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 20,
2010),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2010/04/20/teens-and-mobile-phones/
[https://perma.cc/
6W87-5RD8] (noting that seventy-five percent of twelve through seventeen-year-olds own cell
phones and noting further that sixty-five percent of cell-owning teens attending schools that
completely ban phones nonetheless bring them to school; sixty-four percent have texted in class;
and twenty-five percent have made calls in class). The popularity of cell phones makes cell
phone-regulation policies difficult for schools to enforce. See, e.g., Paul Barnwell, Do
SmartPhones Have a Place in the Classroom? THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 27, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/04/do-smartphones-have-a-place-in-theclassroom/480231/ [https://perma.cc/27XA-HCB8] (stating that “it’s a constant struggle to keep
kids engaged in lessons and off their phones” and noting that in 2015, New York City rescinded
its cell phone ban for its public schools).
141. See Barnwell, supra note 140 (citing evidence that “[h]igh levels of smartphone use by
teens often have a detrimental effect on achievement, because teen phone use is dominated by
entertainment, not learning, applications”); see also Louis-Philippe Beland & Richard Murphy, Ill
Communication: Technology, Distraction & Student Performance, 41 LAB. ECON. 61, 62 (2016)
(finding that “following a ban on phone use, student test scores improve by 6.41 percent of a
standard deviation” and that “[t]his effect is driven by the most disadvantaged and underachieving
pupils”); Alissa J. Rubin & Elian Peltier, France Bans Smartphones in Schools Through 9th
Grade. Will it Help Students?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
09/20/world/europe/france-smartphones-schools.html
[https://perma.cc/9REQ-Q637
(dark
archive)].
142. See, e.g., Cell Phones in the Classroom: Learning Tool or Distraction, OXFORD
LEARNING (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.oxfordlearning.com/should-cell-phones-be-allowedclassrooms/ [https://perma.cc/PV5B-JQJS] (describing how student use of cell phones can cause
disruptions when teachers need to tell students to turn them off).
143. See Tammy Grubb, Durham High School Students’ Cell Phones Seized After Sex Acts
Reported at High School,
THE HERALD-S UN (Durham
May 22,
2019),
https://www.heraldmailmedia.com/news/nation/durham-n-c-students-phones-seized-after-sexacts-reported/article_6604f4f1-3641-5c2a-a4ad-b9791df75e45.html
[https://perma.cc/DA8KKNXA] (describing police warrants for student cell phones after reports of students having sex in
school, videotaping it, and posting video to various social media platforms).
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conjunction with an in-school arrest by a SRO.144 For example, if Manuel
had become upset and disorderly when trailed by the SRO, so much so that
he had disrupted a class or perhaps become physically resistant when the
SRO confronted him, he might have been arrested and charged with
disorderly conduct in a school. 145 In that case, all of Manuel’s belongings,
including his cell phone, conceivably could have been subject to seizure
pursuant to the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine. 146 Were Manuel to lack a
passcode or other encryption device on his phone, any incoming texts could
be visible to school police. In addition, if the officer and administration
wanted to investigate their suspicion that Manuel was involved with a
gang, they could apply for a search warrant to review the contents of the
cell phone;147 they might also decide on their own that no warrant is
required and simply commence searching.148
Once school administrators obtain students’ phones, they potentially
have access to a wealth of personal information about these students,
particularly when the phone seized is a smartphone. These devices can
indicate, at a minimum, whom students know, how often they contact them,
and the content of their personal communications. 149 The unique features of
cell phones and smartphones—the amount of information they store, the
length of time they store it for, and the amount of information that each
piece of data can reveal about a smartphone owner—were noted by the
Supreme Court in Riley v. California.150
144. See infra Section I.B.2.c. for further discussion of school policing and its role in student
surveillance.
145. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.4(A)(6) (2017).
146. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484–85 (2014) (discussing search-incident-toarrest doctrine as being justified by arrestee’s reduced expectation of privacy, officer safety, and
need to prevent destruction of evidence).
147. Id. at 2485–88 (holding that the rationale for the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does
not apply to cell phone contents and holding further that search warrants are therefore required to
search cell phones when they are seized pursuant to an arrest).
148. For an argument that the privacy-protecting rationale for cell phones may not apply to
cell phones seized in school, see Bernard James, T.L.O. and Cell Phones: Student Privacy and
Smart Devices After Riley v. California, 101 IOWA L. REV. 343, 354 (2015); see also infra
Section II.D.
149. In Riley, the Court found that “[c]ell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative
sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person.” Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489.
One major difference is the quantity of material that a modern cell phone can store, amounting to
“millions of pages of text, thousands of pictures, or hundreds of videos.” Id. The Court then
pinpointed “several interrelated privacy consequences.” Id. Of particular note, the Court found
that the collection of distinct types of information located in just one place “reveal[s] much more
in combination than any isolated record.” Id. Additionally, the storage capacity “allows even just
one type of information to convey far more than previously possible.” Id. Lastly, the Court found
the length of time of recorded data allowed for far more information to be gathered at one time.
Id. Together, “there is an element of pervasiveness that characterizes cell phones but not physical
records.” Id. at 2490.
150. Id.
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As with digital learning devices, 151 cell phone confiscation
provisions—and, indeed, any mechanism through which school officials or
school resource officers obtain students’ cell phones—are not necessarily
implemented and relied upon for the express purpose of conducting
surveillance on students. They instead reflect and express other normative
values, such as the need for students to learn without electronic distraction
and the imperative for evidence gathering upon certain custodial arrests.
Nonetheless, particularly when considered in combination with the
technologies for watching and other policies for monitoring and control,
these provisions can have the effect of further diminishing students’
privacy and adding to the ways in which schools increasingly resemble
Bentham’s Panopticon. 152
c.

Expansion of School Policing

According to an estimate from the 2018 North Carolina School
Research Officer Survey, approximately 1200 SROs are employed in the
state, up from 1000 in 2015.153 Along with an increase in the number of
officers, their role has also expanded. Many schools have written
memoranda of understanding between law enforcement agencies and
school districts.154 While some memoranda demand that SROs “avoid any
school disciplinary work,” others do the opposite, for example empowering
SROs to “enforce the school district’s student disciplinary process.”155 One
report described an SRO who conceded that he was “play[ing] [school
discipline] by ear” and who eventually assumed a role in writing school
discipline reports on issues as minor as uniform violations.156
One thing that appears common among SROs regardless of the role
they play in school discipline is that they are privy to significant amounts
of student data. Notwithstanding recent developments at the federal and
state level away from the practice of treating minors like adults for all

151. See supra Section I.B.1.a.
152. See Thomas McMullan, What Does the Panopticon Mean in the Age of Digital
Surveillance?, GUARDIAN (July 23, 2015, 03:00 EDT) https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2015/jul/23/panopticon-digital-surveillance-jeremy-bentham [https://perma.cc/G68Z7QQA].
153. N.C. DEP’T OF P UB. INSTRUCTION, 2018 NORTH C AROLINA SCHOOL RESOURCE
OFFICER SURVEY 3 (2018); N.C. DEP’T OF P UB. SAFETY, 2015 NORTH C AROLINA SCHOOL
RESOURCE OFFICER CENSUS 3 (2015).
154. See N.C. DEP’T OF PUB. S AFETY, supra note 153, at 4 (describing more than three
quarters of SROs who are aware of memoranda of understanding between the law enforcement
department and the school).
155. Josh Gupta-Kagan, Reevaluating School Searches Following School-to-Prison Pipeline
Reforms, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2013, 2040 (2019).
156. See id.
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aspects of criminal prosecution, 157 law enforcement does not observe
distinctions between adults and minors in terms of the information officers
collect from individuals whom they encounter. 158
The digital revolution has affected policing as much as it has altered
education, and it has dramatically increased the ability of law enforcement
to collect, store, retrieve, and share data. 159 The number of public and
private entities that eventually can access law enforcement data has also
expanded dramatically. 160 Recently enacted laws in other states have
explicitly authorized the sharing of student data among schools, social
services agencies, social media companies, and law enforcement. 161 In
North Carolina, at least one school district warns students that it will share

157. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012) (holding that mandatory lifewithout-parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment); J.D.B. v. North Carolina,
564 U.S. 261, 280–81 (2011) (holding that law enforcement must consider age when deciding
whether an individual is in custody for purposes of providing a Miranda warning); Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 81 (2010) (outlawing life-without-parole sentences for individuals who
committed non-homicide crimes under the age of eighteen); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
577 (2005) (declaring unconstitutional the imposition of capital punishment for crimes committed
when the offender was under the age of eighteen); see also LaToya Powell, “Raise the Age” is
Now the Law in North Carolina, N.C. CRIM. L. (Aug. 31, 2007, 7:46 AM),
https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/raise-age-now-law-north-carolina/
[https://perma.cc/6R9ZLZ9B] (describing the fact that, as of December 1, 2019, most sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds in
North Carolina will now have their cases heard in delinquency rather than adult district court, in a
change to historical practice that means that North Carolina is now no longer the only state to cap
juvenile court jurisdiction at the age of sixteen).
158. See Kevin Lapp, Databasing Delinquency, 67 HASTINGS L. J. 195, 208 (2015).
159. See id. (“Computer technology has enabled networked storage, powerful search capacity,
real time updating, and near instantaneous retrieval by officers in the station house and the field .
. . . All told, the criminal justice system collects a remarkable amount of information about youth:
contacts with police, suspicions, misbehavior, arrests, charges, convictions, and sentences. But it
is not just criminal information that is being collected, stored, and shared. Law enforcement
collects genetic samples from juveniles; it catalogs their friends, family, associations, and
movements; and the law requires that personal information of youth convicted or adjudicated
delinquent of sex offenses, such as their home address and school, be posted on the Internet.”).
Eisha Jain has documented how police data is often incomplete and inaccurate. Eisha Jain,
Capitalizing on Criminal Justice, 67 DUKE L.J. 1381, 1418 (2018) (“The FBI adds between
10,000 and 12,000 new names to its criminal record database every day. There are approximately
80 million individuals in the database altogether. Despite being easy to access, these records
consist of notoriously bad data. Criminal records repositories are rife with inaccuracies and
mistaken identity information, as well as old, expunged, and dismissed arrest records. Nearly 50
percent of the records in the FBI database are incomplete.”).
160. See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL L IFE 11 (2009). Nissenbaum divides the concerns over new technologies
into three categories: (1) monitoring and tracking, (2) dissemination and publication, and (3)
aggregation and analysis. Id.
161. See Benjamin Herold, To Stop School Shootings, Fla. Will Merge Government Data,
Social Media Posts, EDUC. WEEK (July 26, 2018), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/
2018/07/26/to-stop-school-shootings-fla-will-merge.html [https://perma.cc/872A-KZDU].
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student data with third-party private and public entities. 162 Privacy
advocates critique the conscription of private surveillance technologies by
the police, decrying what they describe as the “if you build it, they will
come principle—anytime a technology company creates a system that
could be used in surveillance, law enforcement inevitably comes
knocking.”163 At present, SROs can likely access each of the various
surveillance technologies and obtain information from the anonymous tip
line as well, simply by asking for it. 164
The 2018 North Carolina state budget allocated $5 million in
additional funding for SROs in elementary and middle schools, providing
for the hiring of officers to supplement the thousands already working in
the state’s K-12 schools.165 Nationally, school-based policing is “the fastest
growing area of law enforcement”;166 North Carolina reflects this trend. 167

162. See Policy Code 630: Acceptable Use for Internet and Computer Resources, CASWELL
CTY. SCHS. BOARD EDUC. POL’Y, http://images.pcmac.org/Uploads/CaswellCounty/
CaswellCounty/Divisions/DocumentsCategories/Documents/ACCEPTABLE%20USE%20Revise
d%20June%202012.pdf [https://perma.cc/LPM5-WCUZ] (detailing the Caswell County School
District’s policy, which states that it “reserves the right to disclose any user’s electronic
communications or data to Caswell County School System or non-Caswell County School
System’s personnel or agencies to the extent permitted or required by law, including disclosure to
public safety and social service officials or other legitimate third parties”).
163. Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Tracking Phones, Google Is a Dragnet for the Police, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/13/us/google-locationtracking-police.html [https://perma.cc/Q8PN-YSHV (dark archive)] (describing the “geofence”
warrants law enforcement sends to Google and other tech companies that specify an area and time
period and require the tech company to supply any information on all devices recorded in that
area).
164. See infra Section II.D, for a discussion of whether and how existing judicial precedent
offers any meaningful restraint on school police officers seeking to access student information.
165. Current Operations Appropriations Act of 2018, ch. 5, § 7.27(e), 2018-2 N.C. Adv.
Legis. Serv. 1, 36 (LexisNexis) (allocating a total of $12 million for School Resource Officer
grant program).
166. About NASRO, NAT’L ASS’N SCH. RES. OFFICERS, https://nasro.org/about/
[https://perma.cc/KY84-L52D]. In 1975, only one percent of school principals reported the
presence of on-site police officers, but between 1999 and 2008, the U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (“COPS”) granted over $750 million to local
police departments for hiring and training more than 6500 new SROs. See Amanda Merkwae,
Schooling the Police: Race, Disability, and the Conduct of School Resource Officers, 21 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 147, 158–59 (2015). After the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School, COPS
announced plans to create nearly 1000 more positions including more than 350 school resource
officer positions. See Press Release, Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., Office of the Attorney
General, Attorney General Eric Holder Delivers Remarks at the International Association of
Chiefs
of
Police
Annual
Conference
(Oct.
21,
2013),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-delivers-remarks-internationalassociation-chiefs-police [https://perma.cc/9ZAJ-KZVD].
167. See N.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUST. & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, ANNUAL SCHOOL
RESOURCE OFFICER CENSUS 2 (2008) (showing that North Carolina has followed the trend of
increasing use of SROs).
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II. NOT SO FAST: IDENTIFYING COMPETING CONSIDERATIONS
Because schools are legally liable for the well-being of their
students,168 one might assume that districts have implemented
surveillance169 technologies and policies pursuant to a deliberative process
in which policymakers have carefully balanced benefits against harms.
Such a process ought to include the following: assessment of the efficacy
of the various tools and techniques; exploration of countervailing student
privacy interests; consideration of whether and how surveillance
disproportionately affects marginalized students; and evaluation of whether
federal or state statutes, or judicial precedent, bar or restrict the
implementation of certain surveillance technologies and policies.
As the following sections will demonstrate, however, there is scant
evidence that school districts have considered these issues as they have
engaged in surveillance policymaking. Rather, schools have moved with
undue haste to adopt ever-more sophisticated technologies and to create
comprehensive monitoring policies.
A.

Thin Evidence Base and Unintended Harms

The creation and implementation of technologies for watching 170 and
policies for monitoring and control 171 are premised on the notion that they
achieve their intended purposes: improved learning outcomes and student
safety. The safety imperative seems, as evidenced by state and federal
legislative priorities, 172 to be particularly pronounced. 173 However, for many

168. See Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 644 (1999).
169. See Richards, supra note 24, at 1937 (defining surveillance as involving observation and
monitoring).
170. See supra Section I.B.1.
171. See supra Section I.B.2.
172. See Current Operations Appropriations Act of 2018, ch. 5, § 7.27(g), 2018-2 N.C. Adv.
Legis. Serv. 1, 36 (LexisNexis) (allocating $3 million in school-safety training for school
personnel to help students in the event of a traumatic event and establishing an anonymous tip
line); see also id. § 7.27(f) (noting $2 million to create “Grants for Students in Crisis,” including
the creation of crisis respite services for parents, “training and expanded services for therapeutic
foster care families and licensed child placement agencies that provide services to students who
need support to manage their mental health or have cognitive or behavioral problems,
developmental delays, or aggressive behavior,” and “any other crisis service, including peer-topeer mentoring, that is likely to increase school safety”). While it did not pass any legislation
addressing firearm access, the North Carolina General Assembly’s House Select Committee on
School Safety urged the enactment of legislation requiring that students receive first-aid
instruction “on the immediate response to bleeding, how to recognize life threatening bleeding,
and appropriate ways to stop the bleeding.” F INAL REPORT OF THE H. COMM. ON SCH. S AFETY,
H. 2018 Sess., at 13 (N.C. 2018).
173. HEATHER L. SCHWARTZ ET. AL., CAN TECHNOLOGY MAKE SCHOOLS S AFER? 2 (2016)
(noting that “[m]any [schools] have turned to technology . . . [as a way] to prevent, intervene in,
respond to, and protect schools from . . . violent acts and risk to students’ safety”).
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of these technologies, the evidence of efficacy is scant; others have not
been tested at all.174 What is more, the technologies and policies can lead to
problematic and unintended consequences that policymakers may not have
fully considered.
Consider, first, digital learning technologies generally. The embrace
of big data in the classroom has occurred largely without a thorough vetting
of the various products.175 Notwithstanding enthusiasm of many educators,
there is a dearth of research supporting claims that educational technology
in fact improves learning outcomes for all students. 176 Particularly given
countervailing privacy interests implicated by digital learning, 177 this
absence of a research base is troubling as it leaves policymakers without
the ability to weigh digital learning’s benefits against its harms.178
Consider, second, safety management platforms and social media
scanning. Much of what is known about their efficacy comes from the
creators of the products rather than from independent research. 179
Representatives from the student monitoring software programs tout their
products’ effectiveness at preventing harm. Gaggle, for example, includes
on its website multiple accounts of school administrators, often

174. Stefanie Dazio, Schools Turn to Apps, Other Tech to Guard Against Shootings,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(May
16,
2019),
https://www.apnews.com/
867814eff37a40b8b1c4f8e67486b2d8 [https://perma.cc/L453-YQY9] (quoting Dennis Kenney, a
professor at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, saying “[w]e’ve kind of reached this state
of frustration where we (feel like we) can’t protect our students . . . . What we’re trying to do is
find some technological fix, and there isn’t one”).
175. Zeide, Limits Of Education, supra note 40, at 516 (arguing that “[t]here are few research
studies showing that new technologies will provide better outcomes for students, schools, or the
education system overall” and that “[m]any new data-driven education technologies have not
been thoroughly vetted”).
176. See Matt Barnum, As Ed Reformers Urge a ‘Big Bet’ on Personalized Learning,
Research Points to Potential Rewards—and Risks, CHALKBEAT (May 22, 2017),
https://www.chalkbeat.org/posts/us/2017/05/22/as-ed-reformers-urge-a-big-bet-on-personalizedlearning-research-points-to-potential-rewards-and-risks/
[https://perma.cc/G3AJ-P73Z]
(cautioning that the evidence base for personalized learning technology is in its infancy and
warning against a wholehearted embrace of digital learning without fully understanding its
benefits and costs).
177. See infra Section II.B.
178. See infra Part III (discussing how to engage in more appropriate, evidence-based
policymaking around surveillance).
179. Heather L. Schwartz et al., The Role of Technology in Improving K–12 School Safety,
RAND
CORP.
(2016),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1488.html
[https://perma.cc/45CT-2EKA] (noting that “rigorous research about the effectiveness of these
technologies is virtually non-existent” and noting studies that state “it is important to keep in
mind the limitations of the methods we employed. The most important is that we do not present
causal evidence about whether specific school technologies reduce violence; this evidence is
lacking from the research literature at large and an efficacy study of any one or more technologies
was not within our scope” (citations omitted)).
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accompanied by police, responding to students believed to be at risk. 180 The
company then concludes that its intervention prevented imminent harm.
Yet these “success stories” do not consider competing accounts from
other involved parties, nor do they contemplate the possibility that a
Gaggle intervention led to negative long-term outcomes. For example, in
one description of an incident involving interception of a student suicide
plan, Gaggle asserted that “[t]he student now realizes the importance of
being cautious [with] how you express yourself in an email.” 181 One
wonders, however, how much this student has been prevented from
thoughts of self-harm as opposed to being deterred from ever again
expressing her feelings about it in writing.182 If a student has other avenues
to express her pain, she may get the help she needs; if, however, this
particular means of communication was her only one, she may turn her
negative feelings inward, internalizing the lesson that reaching out may
yield only a police visit. 183 What is more, the stigma and fear that a police
visit may cause students is not discussed. 184
180. See, e.g., Round Rock Independent School District: How Gaggle Supports David’s Law
and Keeps Students Safe, GAGGLE, https://www.gaggle.net/success-stories/round-rockindependent-school-district [https://perma.cc/69AS-FAWJ] (discussing safety team that monitors
student communication and recounting one incident of dispatching a team of police officers and
others to the home of a student who had written about a plan to commit suicide); Wassau School
District: The Priceless Value of a Student’s Life, GAGGLE, https://www.gaggle.net/successstories/wausau-school-district [https://perma.cc/M8BX-TWXG] (noting that “[o]n a few
occasions, thanks to Gaggle notifications, the district has asked local police to do wellness checks
at students’ homes”).
181. Warsaw Community Schools: How Much is Student Safety Worth? Responding to Cries
for
Help,
GAGGLE,
https://www.gaggle.net/success-stories/warsaw-community-schools
[https://perma.cc/7NDB-VM6T] (discussing sending school resource officer and local police
officer to home of a student who had made a self-harm threat over Gmail).
182. Stolzoff, supra note 75 (quoting Daphne Keller, Director of the Stanford Center for
Internet and Society, critiquing these products for this reason: “Suppose you are a kid considering
suicide and you want to write a diary about it or talk to your friend about the feelings that you’re
having, but you don’t because you’re afraid you’ll be turned into [sic] your parent . . . I’m not
sure that’s a good outcome”); see Student Safety that Saves Lives, GAGGLE,
https://www.gaggle.net/success-stories/edison-township-public-schools/ [https://perma.cc/7SLY2U35] (describing superintendent in a district who received a late-night phone call one weekend
about a student reportedly trying to hurt herself and who noted “[m]any of our students express
themselves through writing”); Wassau School District, supra note 180 (describing how Gaggle’s
Safety Management Program allowed administrators to prevent an attempted suicide).
183. See, e.g., Alice E. Marwick & danah boyd, Networked Privacy: How Teenagers
Negotiate Context in Social Media, 16 NEW MEDIA & S OC’Y, 1051, 1061 (2014) (explaining that
“teenagers create trust by revealing information” when “they are confident that it cannot hurt
them”).
184. See, e.g., Student Safety Doesn’t Take the Summer Off, GAGGLE,
https://www.gaggle.net/success-stories/wisconsin-rapids-public-schools/
[https://perma.cc/
M5GF-Q2JS] (describing team with “diverse backgrounds in education, law enforcement and
other fields,” that responded to a student, helped avert a crisis, but not describing any plans for
subsequent investigation or assistance). But see How Much is Student Safety Worth? Responding
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Because Gaggle does not reveal or presumably even study the longterm impacts of their interventions, it is unclear whether the potentially
deterrent effect on free expression is outweighed by the platform’s
purported salutary features.
Other elements related to the efficacy of safety management platforms
deserve, but may not receive, close investigation by education
policymakers. For example, while detection and prevention of potential
student self-harm are critical functions, Gaggle may not be the best way to
achieve them. Much of the administration of Gaggle and similar tools is left
to school Information Technology Specialists, who have neither the
training nor institutional capacity to know how to evaluate and respond to
students who present with mental health problems. 185 What is more, there is
a troubling lack of transparency with students and families regarding what
words trigger a Gaggle alert as well as how discretion is deployed
regarding when to send an officer to a student’s home. The design of
Gaggle—and the lack of transparency regarding how it is implemented—
makes the tool vulnerable to its being used for purposes other than ensuring
student safety, thus potentially diminishing its efficacy overall.186
Third, the ubiquity of surveillance cameras might suggest that they are
effective at deterring violence, crime, and lesser infractions, in addition to
investigating their occurrence. One concern regarding studies that do
appear to show a positive relationship between the presence of cameras and
a reduction in crime, however, is that they fail to rule out the possibility of
a displacement effect; that is, technology may simply move misbehavior to
locations just outside the range of cameras.187 While this concern may not
seem as persuasive given, in this setting, surveillance cameras are
increasingly stationed throughout most areas of a school, it is nonetheless

to Cries for Help, GAGGLE, https://www.gaggle.net/success-stories/warsaw-community-schools/
[https://perma.cc/LT9B-WRLY] (noting a school resource officer going to a student’s home after
a report of self-harm and stating that the family expressed gratitude).
185. Anya Kamenetz, Schools Turn to Software for Suicide Prevention—But Not Everyone’s
On Board, NPR (Mar. 28, 2016, 4:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/2016/03/28/472176259/schoolsturn-to-software-for-suicide-prevention-but-not-everyones-on-board
[https://perma.cc/TMB8EVGX].
186. Stolzoff, supra note 75 (noting that one Gaggle post, since deleted, suggests that the tool
could have been used to squelch teacher organizing: “‘[t]hink about the recent teacher work
stoppage in West Virginia,’ a recent blog post reads. ‘Could the story have been different if
school leaders there requested search results for “health insurance” or “strike” months earlier?
Occasional searches for “salary” or “layoffs” could stave off staff concerns that lead to adverse
press for your school district’” (internal citation omitted)); cf. infra note 191 and accompanying
text (explaining the diminished efficacy of tip lines due to improper use).
187. Stolzoff, supra note 75.
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the case that other studies of the efficacy of cameras as a deterrent have
yielded mixed and inconclusive results. 188
Fourth, the evidence base for anonymous tip lines is scant at best.
While the tip lines have great political appeal, 189 whether or not these tip
lines will work depends on non-technological factors such as the
availability of staff to both train students in how to use them and to monitor
and appropriately respond to tips. 190 In the absence of such training, it will
be possible that the tip lines could become repositories for student gossip or
vendettas. Indeed, in Colorado, which was one of the first states to create a
tip line, lawmakers documented instances of students using the tool to
make false reports of suicide attempts and drug use. 191 However, other than
the broad requirement that the tip line function to “receive anonymous
information on internal or external risks to the school population, school
buildings, and school-related activities,” the enabling statutory language in
North Carolina gives no guidance about the content or scope of the
information that is to be collected, or whether and how students and staff
will be trained in using it. 192
Tip line efficacy ultimately depends on adults sifting through the
information and responding in ways that inspire students to trust that
providing this information was the right thing to do; in other words, the
technology works only if a school climate of trust already exists. 193 As
social scientists researching the efficacy of the tip lines explain,

188. Warnick, supra note 113, at 319–20.
189. See supra Section I.B.2.a.
190. See infra notes 191–94 and accompanying text.
191. Shaun Boyd, Lawmakers Work to Keep Safe2Tell A Place To Prevent Bullying, Not
Promote It, CBS DENVER (May 3, 2018), https://denver.cbslocal.com/2018/05/03/safe-2-tellstate-capitol-school-bully/ [https://perma.cc/6ZTP-98EQ]; see also Blad, supra note 128 (noting
incidents of students using the tip line to “prank” other students, including falsely reporting
suicide threats).
192. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-105.51 (2017). See generally Katherine W. Joyce, 2018 Laws
Affecting School Safety in North Carolina,
N.C. ASS’N SCH. ADMINS.,
https://www.ncasa.net/cms/lib/NC02219226/Centricity/Domain/59/2018%20Laws%20Affecting
%20School%20Safety%20in%20NC.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7LA-V8AY] (surveying laws passed
to address school safety, discussing tip line, and not including any information about funding for
training for staff and students about how to use the tip line).
193. See generally Schwartz et al., supra note 179 (discussing successes and challenges of
rolling out programs in communities across the United States). Some districts seem to recognize
the need for non-technological resources to supplement tip line technology. See Sophie Quinton,
To Prevent Suicides and School Shootings, More States Embrace Anonymous Tip Lines, PEW
CHARITABLE
TR .
(Mar.
16,
2018),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2018/03/16/to-prevent-suicides-and-school-shootings-more-statesembrace-anonymous-tip-lines [https://perma.cc/U57Y-A3DM] (noting a Nevada district that
hired social workers to deal with the many tips that were anticipated in the wake of the creation of
the tip line).
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“[t]echnology alone . . . is not the answer. School and youth engagement
are critical to ensuring widespread technology adoption and use.” 194
Finally, also unanalyzed in the political and policymaking discourse
around school safety is the efficacy of school resource officers. While
ongoing funding seems all but assured given the spike in gun violence in
2018,195 studies are inconclusive about whether SROs in fact make schools
safer.196 Additional research undercuts the safety claims of SRO
proponents: some research indicates that a visible uniformed police
presence may actually make some students—chiefly Black students and
students who previously have been victimized—feel less safe in school. 197
And feeling safe is important to other school administration goals such as
school connectedness, which is a deterrent to misconduct and violence in
school198 and is helpful in promoting positive educational outcomes. 199
B.

Undervaluing Student Privacy Interests

Clearly, some question exists as to whether student surveillance
technologies and policies are effective at improving safety and learning
outcomes. However, the absence of a conclusive evidence base might not
necessarily mean, by itself, that schools should abandon surveillance. After
all, an evidence base that is thin is not the same as definitive proof of
ineffectiveness. If any of these technologies and policies, either alone or in
combination, prevents even one school shooting (or minimizes its damage),

194. Hsing-Fang Hsieh et al., Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Say Something Anonymous
Reporting System to Improve School Safety, POPULATION S TUD. CTR.: INST. FOR SOC. RES.,
https://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/research/project-detail/37452
[https://perma.cc/J3YA-4GR6]
(describing multi-year study of anonymous tip lines).
195. While 2018 was the deadliest year on record for school shootings, see German Lopez,
2018 Was by Far the Worst Year on Record for Gun Violence in Schools, VOX (Dec. 10, 2018),
https://www.vox.com/2018/12/10/18134232/gun-violence-schools-mass-shootings
[https://perma.cc/XC6J-7A29] (surveying data from a national comprehensive database and
concluding that the number of school gun violence incidents in 2018 was the highest on record),
the fact remains that schools are overwhelmingly safe places for youth; school shootings are in
fact rare. See Scott, supra note 84, at 541; see also Theriot, supra note 85, at 280.
196. See Theriot, supra note 85, at 280; see also Edward W. Hill, The Cost of Arming
Schools: The Price of Stopping a Bad Guy with a Gun 3, 8 (Mar. 28, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (arguing that SROs cost more than the
benefits that they provide and noting that paying for one armed SRO in each school in America
would cost between $9.9 billion and $12.8 billion and questioning whether the funding spent on
police security could be better spent on enhancing student academic performance).
197. Matthew T. Theriot & John G. Orme, School Resource Officers and Students’ Feelings
of Safety at School, 14 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 130, 130 (2014).
198. Id. at 133.
199. Robert W. Blum, A Case for School Connectedness, EDUC. LEADERSHIP, Apr. 2005, at
16 (surveying the research and concluding that school connectedness “increases the likelihood of
academic success”).
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prevents student self-harm, or lessens the occurrence of other forms of
violence, then doesn’t the emerging surveillance regime justify itself?
This Article does not argue that surveillance is always without benefit,
or that it should never be pursued. 200 It argues, instead, that education
policymakers too often undervalue student privacy interests, fail to
consider surveillance’s often inequitable and unfair application, 201 and may
be unaware of the legal constraints to surveillance. 202 This section takes up
student privacy.
Julie Cohen articulates both the descriptive and normative dimensions
of privacy, explaining that “[i]t is both a structural condition and a related
entitlement.”203 Her assertion that “[t]o say that individuals (or
communities) have—or should have—rights to privacy is to make a
normative statement about the importance of preserving the breathing room
necessary for self-articulation”204 has special salience when considering the
nature and importance of student privacy.
Privacy scholars identify discrete categories of privacy interests: at a
minimum, “physical” privacy, which is violated when a person’s legitimate
efforts to conceal herself are frustrated; “informational” privacy, which is
contravened when identity information a person wants to protect is
nonetheless acquired; and “decisional” privacy, which is violated when an
individual’s ability to make choices about personal and intimate matters is
abrogated.205 Generally speaking, these rights are conceptualized as liberty
rights.206
Courts and legislatures do not typically recognize minors as
possessing liberty rights to the same degree as adults because minors
lack—or are thought to lack—the cognitive and emotional capacity to
engage in the necessary deliberation to make informed choices.207 Instead,
200. See infra Part III (discussing principles to guide student surveillance policymaking).
201. See infra Section II.C.
202. See infra Section II.D.
203. Cohen, Surveillance Versus Privacy, supra note 6, at 458.
204. Id.
205. See ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE? 3 (2011); see also
William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (outlining the four key personal
privacy rights: the right to seclusion, the right to control the use of one’s name and likeness, the
right to control publication of certain personal facts, and the right not to be depicted in false
light).
206. See, e.g., Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119,
125 (2004) (“Privacy is thus protected by reference to general, well-defined, and generally
accepted political principles addressing the balance of power, which, among other things, set
limits on government intrusiveness into the lives and liberty of individuals.”).
207. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (finding “[a] lack of maturity and
an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are
more understandable among the young” and that “[t]hese qualities often result in impetuous and
ill-considered actions and decisions” before ruling for this reason, among others, that the juvenile
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minors possess welfare208 and dependency209 rights—to be protected from
child abuse or neglect, to be kept out of the formal labor market, and to be
immunized against legal consequences that would attach if they were
permitted to execute legally enforceable contracts, for example. 210 Parents
and guardians of children are presumed—and given the legal authority211—
to make decisions about their children’s health and education based on a
socially shared understanding that parents and guardians act in their
children’s best interests. 212 Schools are given the authority to act in loco
parentis when students are in their care. 213 It seems to make little sense,
then, to think of children as possessing privacy rights if those rights are
understood only as liberty rights.
It is possible, however, to conceptualize the right to privacy as a
welfare214 or developmental215 right and to extend it in age-appropriate
ways to children. Consider the example of unwanted exposure of a child’s
body. As philosophy of education professor Bryan Warnick argues, such
exposure “can cause serious psychological, financial, or even physical

death penalty violated the Eight Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment
because minors categorically lack the kind of criminal culpability that can justify the death
penalty); Larry Cunningham, A Question of Capacity: Towards a Comprehensive and Consistent
Vision of Children and Their Status Under Law, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 275, 320
(2006) (noting that minors are deemed not to have the capacity to make a valid will or to
otherwise make a testamentary designation).
208. Anne C. Dailey, Children’s Constitutional Rights, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2099, 2135 n.164
(2011) (surveying field of scholarship conceptualizing children’s rights as welfare rights).
209. Joel Feinberg, The Child’s Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE C HILD? CHILDREN’S
RIGHTS, P ARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND S TATE POWER 124 (William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette
eds., 1980) (delineating “dependency rights” of children including right to be fed, nourished, and
protected).
210. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Whatever Happened to Children’s Rights?, 80 MINN. L. REV.
267, 279–80 (1995) (describing Progressive Era initiatives to address child welfare including laws
requiring school attendance and those restricting child labor).
211. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967) (describing that the state has power parens patriae,
derived from chancery practice, to act in loco parentis to protect the property interests and person
of the child).
212. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (“The law’s concept of the family rests on
a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for
judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions.”). But see Barbara Bennett Woodhouse,
“Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV.
995, 1051–52 (1992) (describing how children’s rights often conflict with parental rights).
213. See, e.g., Garcia v. City of New York, 646 N.Y.S.2d 508, 510–511 (N.Y. App. Div.
1996) (providing an example of a situation where a school, acting in loco parentis, did not act
with ordinary prudence in the supervision of a five-year-old). For a short discussion of this
common-law doctrine, see supra note 10.
214. See generally Warnick, supra note 113, at 321–22 (describing how the right to privacy
can be explained as a welfare right).
215. See generally Dailey, supra note 208, at 2103–06 (introducing the concept of
developmental rights pertaining to a child’s right to privacy).
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harm.” 216 Being able to control who sees oneself is important for a child’s
healthy development, and protecting children from unwanted self-exposure
can help facilitate that development. Institutions can and do take steps to
reinforce the notion that one can and should keep certain aspects of oneself
private—stores include fitting rooms for trying on clothes, for example,
reflecting and reinforcing the social norm that one should not have to
sacrifice one’s ability to remain clothed in public for the sake of making a
purchase. In other words, privacy—even for young children—deserves and
receives some social protection as a means of promoting their welfare.
The concept of developmental rights is related to the idea of children
as having future rights, or “rights-in-trust.” 217 Philosophers explain that
rights conceptualized this way mean that children’s “capacities are to be
developed to their best advantage.” 218 The notion of a future right is that
children should be able “to have . . . future options kept open until [they
are] fully formed self-determining adult[s] capable of deciding among
them.” 219
When theorists speak of children as possessing future rights, they
typically focus on the skills they need to develop into autonomous adults.220
One important such skill is critical thinking. 221 Schools need to teach
critical thinking, an important component of which involves the negotiation
of whether and how much to argue with peers and teachers, as well as the
consideration of when and how to dissent from conventional wisdom.222 As
students grow and mature, they need to engage in the processes of
“boundary management” that enable and constitute self-development.223 In
other words, they need some degree of privacy, and they need to practice
privacy—that is, to cultivate the abilities they need to one day exercise
autonomy.224 As Julie Cohen argues, “So understood, privacy is
fundamentally dynamic.”225 She asserts that “[i]n a world characterized by
216. See Warnick, supra note 113, at 322.
217. See Dailey, supra note 208, at 2144 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Feinberg, supra note 209, at 125–26).
218. Id. at 2144 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting John Eekelaar, The Emergence of
Children’s Rights, 6 OXFORD J. LEGAL S TUD. 161, 170 (1986)).
219. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Feinberg, supra note 209, at 125–26).
220. See id. at 2145 (“[T]he most common meaning of autonomy in the cases and literature
on children’s rights is the capacity for rational choice.”).
221. Id. (“[C]hildren’s rights theorists emphasize critical thinking as the core component of
the autonomy skills children must learn.”).
222. See generally id. at 2119 (“[T]he Supreme Court has sought to balance the school’s role
in providing a marketplace of ideas against the school's mission to discipline students in the art of
civil discourse.”).
223. See Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1906 (2013)
[hereinafter Cohen, What Privacy Is For].
224. See id.; Warnick, supra note 113, at 323–24.
225. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, supra note 223, at 1906.
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pervasive social shaping of subjectivity, privacy fosters (partial) selfdetermination.” 226 Cohen’s conception of privacy is that “[i]t enables
individuals both to maintain relational ties and to develop critical
perspectives on the world around them.” 227
Once we understand privacy as a child’s welfare or developmental
right, rather than only a negative right against governmental intrusion, it is
easier to see how that right is worth protecting against the emerging student
surveillance regime. Child development scholars argue that surveillance
“does not allow students to practice acting and reasoning independently” 228
and thus keeps them from developing the skills and habits of mind they will
need to one day exercise the liberty rights we afford adults. What is more,
as a new generation of learners becomes acculturated to and accepting of
surveillance, children may be more likely to become adults who do not
value their own privacy—or that of others.229
Research demonstrates the damaging effect of surveillance on
children’s ability to develop in healthy ways. 230 Pervasive surveillance can
create a climate in which adults are seen as overestimating and overreacting
to risk.231 Children, in turn, cannot develop the ability to evaluate and
manage risk themselves in order to function effectively. 232
Social science also suggests that children experience surveillance “as
a form of control that limits their choices and inhibits their ability to act
autonomously.” 233 Surveillance shapes behavior through the threat of
punishment for bad actions, which troublingly means that children may
make decisions based on the potential for negative consequences instead of
as an expression of their own values and beliefs.234 This in turn can

226.
227.
228.
229.

Id.
Id.
Warnick, supra note 113, at 325.
See Josephine Wolff, Opinion, Losing Our Fourth Amendment Data Protection, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/28/opinion/fourth-amendmentprivacy.html [https://perma.cc/CB6W-FM2H (dark archive)] (warning that the “reasonable
expectation of privacy” doctrine is problematic in a digital age in which people voluntarily
relinquish personal information to third parties because “as soon as we begin expecting
companies to collect lots of data about us, we stand to lose our Fourth Amendment protections for
that data”).
230. OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMM’R OF CAN., SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES AND
CHILDREN
9
(Oct.
2012),
https://www.priv.gc.ca/media/1751/opc_201210_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C3BY-TJVX].
231. Id. at 6.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 7.
234. Id.
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diminish children’s ability to “self-regulate,”235 to navigate personal
boundaries, and to learn to assess risk and reward on their own. 236
When students are aware of school surveillance, it may have the effect
of inducing passivity or self-censorship. 237 When they believe that their
every move is watched and every written word read, they are less likely to
develop into people who believe that they can and do own and control their
thoughts and actions. 238 A surveillance environment built by trusted
teachers and administrators will socialize children to ignore and even
accept the routine collection and retention of their personal information—to
say nothing of its eventual sale to data brokers. 239 Allowing that acceptance
to be normalized heightens the growing disparity in power between data
users (companies) and data suppliers (students). 240
With alarm, privacy scholars and advocates note that efforts to pass
legislation and create policy to protect privacy will be futile if people
continue to willingly give away the most intimate information about their
lives.241 This abdication of one’s right to an intimate and private sphere is
something that schools should work against. In a world in which people’s
privacy rights are increasingly undermined, 242 schools can either choose to
follow that trend or to proactively teach students the value of privacy—that
they deserve to have it, and that they must respect the privacy rights of each
other.243 Because privacy is critical to the free thought and value formation

235. Id.
236. Cohen, Surveillance Versus Privacy, supra note 6, at 459–60 (“Surveillance presses
against the play of subjectivity and self-development in ways both metaphorical and literal.”).
237. Id. at 460 (“The awareness of surveillance fosters a kind of passivity—a ceding of power
over space.”); see also Bruce Schneier, Surveillance Kills Freedom by Killing Experimentation,
WIRED (Nov. 16, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/mcsweeneys-excerpt-the-rightto-experiment/ [https://perma.cc/T2G3-VDT4].
238. See Warnick, supra note 113, at 325 (“While young people are under surveillance, they
know that others are in charge and that they are not being respected as actors capable of choosing
their own way.”).
239. For a discussion of “omnibus information providers” that buy and sell information as
their core business, see NISSENBAUM, supra note 160, at 45–50.
240. See generally SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE C APITALISM: T HE
FIGHT FOR A HUMAN F UTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2019) (raising concerns about
the rise of “surveillance capitalism”).
241. See Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 733–34 (1999);
see also Wolff, supra note 229.
242. In 1999, Sun Microsystems’ Chief Executive Officer, Scott McNealy, famously opined,
“[y]ou have zero privacy anyway. Get over it.” Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy: ‘Get Over It’,
WIRED
(Jan.
26,
1999),
https://www.wired.com/1999/01/sun-on-privacy-get-over-it/
[https://perma.cc/RB4M-GNLR].
243. But see Marwick & boyd, supra note 183, at 1052–53 (offering a sympathetic account of
why teenagers both engage with technology and social media while simultaneously valuing their
privacy so greatly).
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that characterize participation in a liberal democracy, 244 schools have a role
to play in teaching students an appreciation for it 245—particularly since so
many social forces are working toward privacy’s diminution.
The filtering software required by federal statute 246 that is part of
contemporary student surveillance regimes can sometimes function to keep
students from obtaining important, age-appropriate reproductive health and
sexual orientation/gender identity information that they need from their
schools—especially if they cannot get it from their parents.
Notwithstanding the legislatively and judicially presumed unity of interests
between parent and child, 247 in practice, such unity does not always exist
with respect to reproductive health and sexuality. 248 In these areas, courts
and legislatures recognize that there may in fact be a disjunction.249
Adolescents and teens do and should retain some degree of privacy in these
areas that the law protects, even against their parents.250 Yet student
surveillance changes this equation.
In 2011, for example, the ACLU’s national organization and regional
chapters in several states issued letters demanding that public high schools
remove web-filtering software that blocked items related to support groups
for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender youth.251 The ACLU learned
from students that web filters were routinely blocking access to groups
such as Gay, Lesbian, and Straight Educators Network (“GLSEN”)252 and
the Gay-Straight Alliance Network, along with LGBT anti-bullying and
suicide prevention resources like “It Gets Better” and the “Annual Day of
244. Daniel Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44
SAN D IEGO L. REV. 745, 763 (2007) (“[P]rivacy has a social value.”).
245. For a discussion of the relationship between public education and democracy, see, for
example, Barbara Fedders, Schooling at Risk, 103 IOWA L. REV. 871, 879 (2018) (“The Supreme
Court has recognized the centrality of education to American life, finding public schools to be,
variously, ‘a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of
government,’ ‘the most important function of state and local governments,’ and to play ‘a
fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society.’” (citations omitted)).
246. See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
248. See infra notes 280–82 and accompanying text.
249. See, e.g., State Laws and Policies: Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions,
GUTTMACHER INST. (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/parentalinvolvement-minors-abortions [https://perma.cc/RJ6A-B9A8] (noting that certain jurisdictions
allow minors to waive the parental involvement requirement for abortion procedures through a
judicial bypass procedure after a showing of “clear and convincing evidence” that the minor is
“sufficiently mature”).
250. See id.
251. See AM. CIVIL L IBERTIES UNION, “DON’T F ILTER ME:” F INAL REPORT 7–8, 16–18,
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/dont_filter_me-2012-1001-v04.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T6N6-HURB].
252. See Championing LGBTQ Issues in K-12 Education Since 1990, GLSEN,
https://www.glsen.org/ [https://perma.cc/98Y2-6GB2].
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Silence.”253 In one Washington high school, a dean showed parents a video
of their daughter kissing another girl; the parents, presumably upset by the
same-sex nature of the kissing, withdrew their daughter from the school.254
Sexuality scholars argue that the ability to control self-exposure enables the
formation of queer communities and a safe form of intimacy. 255 School
surveillance resulting in the private information about adolescent and
teenage students being shared with a parent—in other words, “outing” a
student to her parent—changes these dynamics of selective exposure,
which is problematic and sometimes even dangerous when, for example, a
parent is homophobic and such information could lead to verbal or physical
abuse.256
A third and final way that student surveillance negatively affects
students’ privacy interests is that digital learning technologies capture—but
may not protect—significant amounts of student data. Schools have always
gathered, created, and maintained student data—health information,
standardized test scores, grades, and behavioral records, just to name a
few.257 But today’s digital learning devices have expanded the scope of the
available data schools can gather and have made its collection infinitely
easier.258 Indeed, nationwide, “the volume of collected data is growing
exponentially.” 259
When students use digital learning devices and technologies, it is not
only their teachers who gain information about them. Multiple public and
private entities can access student data, just as they can access other sorts
of data.260 Apart from the educational metadata and paradata available

253. See AM. CIVIL L IBERTIES UNION, supra note 251, at 7–8.
254. Neal Conan, Security Cameras in School: Protective or Invasive?, NPR (Sept. 4, 2012),
https://www.npr.org/2012/09/04/160551340/security-cameras-in-school-protective-or-invasive
[https://perma.cc/22J6-P7ER].
255. Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 181,
197–98 (2008) [hereinafter Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, Transparency] (surveying literature).
256. See generally Barbara Fedders, Coming Out for Kids: Recognizing, Respecting, and
Representing LGBTQ Youth, 6 NEV. L. J. 774, 788–89 (2006) (discussing how conflicts at home
over sexual orientation can lead to negative outcomes for LGBTQ youth).
257. CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., STATE S TUDENT PRIVACY L AW C OMPENDIUM 3
(2016), https://cdt.org/files/2016/10/CDT-Stu-Priv-Compendium-FNL.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Q4ND-DGJ8].
258. Student Privacy, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., https://cdt.org/issue/privacydata/student-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/WM66-792Q]; see Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in
Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109, 109 (2018) (“No institution in society seems immune
from the enthusiasm that automated decision-making generates.”).
259. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L.
REV. 327, 354 (2015).
260. CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., supra note 257, at 3; see also Jain, supra note 159, at
1427–28 (noting number of private entities that make use of arrest and criminal records for their
own purposes unrelated to traditional goals of criminal justice); Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers
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about individuals and entire classes—suggesting which students are
struggling, what they are struggling with, and whether and how they can
improve—digital devices can also provide a composite picture so that
educational researchers can study and improve pedagogy and curriculum
on a widespread basis. 261 Perhaps for this reason, the Department of
Education has encouraged schools to use “big data”262 analysis to improve
assessment and educational innovation. 263
The goal of using data to improve pedagogy and curriculum may be
normatively unobjectionable; however, even as schools use these
technologies to further their educational mission, they may also be making
students vulnerable to data capture for non-educational uses by the
companies that provide the products. These companies engage, for
example, in myriad if subtle forms of marketing to students, either in the
present or by obtaining data for future marketing; as the 2016 report
Learning to be Watched: Surveillance Culture at School notes, “[w]hile
such massive amounts of specific and personal data are being collected
about children at school, there is little understanding of how that
information may be used in the future, or how it may be used to manipulate
children and cultivate them as current and future consumers.” 264 In 2017,
the Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”) reported that the providers of
educational technology “are spying on students—and school districts are
. . . unwittingly helping them do it.”265 This report focuses on the collection
of student informational data by digital learning devices as well as the
weak privacy policies of educational technology companies, which
typically lack encryption, data retention guidelines, and protection against
nonconsensual data sharing. 266

and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1089–95 (2002)
(discussing law enforcement’s ability to obtain sensitive data from third parties).
261. Alim et al., supra note 54, at 33–34.
262. This Article adopts Julie Cohen’s definition of “big data.” See Cohen, What Privacy Is
For, supra note 223, at 1920–21 (“‘Big Data’ is shorthand for the combination of a technology
and a process. The technology is a configuration of information-processing hardware capable of
sifting, sorting, and interrogating vast quantities of data in very short times. The process involves
mining the data for patterns, distilling the patterns into predictive analytics, and applying the
analytics to new data. Together, the technology and the process comprise a technique for
converting data flows into a particular, highly data-intensive type of knowledge.”).
263. Alim et al., supra note 54, at 7 (describing “technology in schools [as] giv[ing] states
opportunities to understand student performance over time and be accountable for the effects of
educational initiatives”).
264. BONINGER & MOLNAR, supra note 46, at 14.
265. Alim et al., supra note 54, at 5.
266. BONINGER & MOLNAR, supra note 46, at 16; see infra Section II.D.
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Surveillance can produce reality rather than simply reflecting it.267
Instead of just neutrally monitoring and recording students’ words and
actions, surveillance can convey certain problematic values to students in
ways that are not contested or even interrogated by most public-school
stakeholders. For example, surveillance normalizes the notion that
corporate interests have a legitimate role in education. 268 In addition,
through its ubiquity across time and space, surveillance may encourage
students to avoid experimentation that might draw unwanted attention,
even though such experimentation is developmentally appropriate for
young people whose identities are in flux. Surveillance scholars
argue that “identity” is neither fixed nor unitary, but rather is
constituted by performances that are directed at different audiences.
From this perspective, the problem with surveillance is that it seeks
to constitute individuals as fixed texts upon which invariant
meanings can be imposed. The struggle for privacy is recast as the
individual’s effort to assert multiplicity and resist “norming.” 269
All told, in their embrace of digital technology, educators may
unwittingly be creating a new generation of users accustomed to
surveillance and relinquishing of their data in return for putative benefits.270
And if any students reject the data sharing as a diminution of their privacy,
those students may find themselves at odds with the institutions they need
to prepare them for healthy development.
C.

Equity

While student surveillance is by now nearly universal in public
schools, its application is uneven and inequitable. Surveillance is, in many
cases, reflective of the biases of the people who create and administer its
technologies and create policies. Already vulnerable populations are those
most likely to experience negative repercussions from being surveilled. 271

267. Warnick, supra note 113, at 324–25 (explaining that surveillance changes behaviors and
the meanings that attach to them, arguing that “[a]ctions have different meanings when they are
done alone versus when they are performed in front of an audience. Think of the difference
between criticizing someone in public versus doing the same thing in private—these are two
distinct activities”).
268. BONINGER & MOLNAR, supra note 46, at 3 (writing that the study was “conducted with
the implicit blessing of administrators, teachers, and parents,” and the digital technology regime
“combine[s] to normalize for children the notion that corporations have a legitimate role in their
education and in their lives more generally”).
269. Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, supra note 255, at 187.
270. BONINGER & MOLNAR, supra note 46, at 20–23.
271. BRIDGES, supra note 27, at 32; see Kimberly D. Bailey, Watching Me: The War on
Crime, Privacy, and the State, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1539, 1557 (2014); Hao, supra note 105.
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Low-income students are likely to need school-issued computers for
homework more than higher-income students;272 they are thus more likely
to bear the brunt of surveillance policies that facilitate a school’s ability to
reach into a student’s home. 273 While one might suggest that a possible
remedy is for the student to use her own device rather than the device
issued by the school, such a response ignores the reality that many lowincome students cannot afford the technology on which schools
increasingly rely.274
In addition, studies document the ways in which SROs
disproportionately investigate and arrest students of color, particularly
Black students.275 Perhaps counterintuitively, as SROs incorporate
information from surveillance technologies into their work, the racial
disparities may well continue or even intensify. The reasons for this are
twofold and related. Surveillance technologies are imbued with a sense of
subjectivity by their makers, users, and proponents. 276 Officers may believe
that using data from technology, rather than relying on non-digital means
272. LINDA D ARLING-HAMMOND ET AL., USING TECHNOLOGY TO S UPPORT AT-R ISK
STUDENTS’ LEARNING 11 (2014), https://edpolicy.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/scope-pubusing-technology-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/YJ8J-DQ6N] (describing a study examining the
“implementation of a one-to-one laptop program in three economically different schools in
California” and finding that “lower-income youth demonstrated significantly higher gains in
mathematics relative to the higher-income students, and [that] teachers were most likely to say
they found the laptops to be useful for learning by ‘at-risk’ youth”). When schools increasingly
rely on digital learning materials to deliver material, the need for students to access the internet
increases as well; when low-income students do not have regular and reliable access to the
Internet, the use of digital learning technologies can exacerbate rather than ameliorate wealthbased learning gaps. Monahan, supra note 37 (quoting a Washington public school assistant
superintendent as saying “[o]nce you’ve converted the curriculum, the material, it’s more projectbased learning. You kind of need the Internet for all those pieces to work well. If you’re not able
to provide that last level of connectivity, you’ve now widened the gap in terms of what kids can
do, not to mention the expectation around that”).
273. Suski, supra note 18, at 69; see T.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d
767, 771 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (documenting that a school disciplined students for posting
developmentally normative, if “raunchy,” pictures of themselves taken during a slumber party
that occurred in the summer).
274. Alim et al., supra note 54, at 6; see DARLING-HAMMOND et al., supra note 272, at 2–4
(noting wealth-based gaps in technology ownership).
275. See, e.g., Kenneth Alonzo Anderson, Does More Policing Make Middle Schools Safer?,
BROOKINGS BROWN C TR. CHALKBOARD (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/browncenter-chalkboard/2018/11/08/does-more-policing-make-middle-schools-safer/ [https://perma.cc/
EHW8-68T9] (noting and describing in detail “evidence of racial disparities in arrests by SROs”);
Nance, Students, Security, and Race, supra note 17, at 41 (“[A]s [a] school’s percentage of
minority students increases, the odds of using combinations of security measures also
increases.”).
276. See, e.g., Nelli Piattoeva, The Imperative to Protect Data and the Rise of Surveillance
Cameras in Administering National Testing in Russia, 15 EUR. EDUC. RES. J. 82, 86 (2015)
(noting that “‘[o]bjectivity’ is a term that figures prominently as an argument to justify the
introduction of . . . digital technologies” into educational policymaking).
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of investigation, may make their work less, rather than more, biased.
Manuel’s experience—drawing attention as a Latino young man with a
group of friends he refers to as his “crew”—is instructive in this regard.
The gestures he and his friends are making are ambiguous, but surveillance
technologies deem them suspicious. 277 Indeed, a significant body of
emerging research has documented that the algorithms on which much
digital technology is based are themselves reflective of the biases of their
creators.278 Thus, communities traditionally disproportionately negatively
affected by policing will draw little if any comfort from the fact that
officers now use supposedly objective surveillance technologies.279
Finally, LGBTQ students disproportionately rely on the internet to
find each other and find information about sexuality otherwise unavailable
to them.280 When they are not open about their sexual orientation and
gender identity to peers or parents and fear that they will be bullied,
abused, or worse, they must be able to keep their internet activity private. 281
Yet such privacy is all but absent in contemporary school surveillance
regimes, which may result in “outing” students to their parents or peers in
ways that can be harmful. 282
D.

Legal Constraints

The law has not kept up with technological innovation. 283 As Omar
Tene and Jules Polonetsky argue:

277. See supra Section I.B (discussing Manuel hypothetical).
278. See, e.g., Hao, supra note 105 (noting and giving examples of bias in artificial
intelligence before concluding that “[w]e often shorthand our explanation of AI bias by blaming it
on biased training data. The reality is more nuanced: bias can creep in long before the data is
collected as well as at many other stages of the deep-learning process”).
279. See BRIDGES, supra note 27, at 32–34 (discussing the history of the diminution of
privacy rights of poor people—especially poor women of color).
280. See, e.g., GLSEN, CIPHR & CCRC, OUT ONLINE: T HE EXPERIENCES OF LESBIAN, GAY,
BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH ON THE INTERNET, at ix–x (2013),
https://www.glsen.org/sites/default/files/Out%20Online%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/6J46KQNQ] (finding that “LGBT youth were five times as likely to have searched for information
online on sexuality or sexual attraction as non-LGBT youth (62 percent vs. 12 percent) . . . more
likely to have searched for health and medical information compared to non-LGBT youth (81
percent vs. 46 percent) . . . [and] four times as likely to have searched for information on
HIV/AIDS and other STIs (sexually transmitted infections) compared to non-LGBT youth (19
percent vs. 5 percent)”).
281. See Allison S. Bohm et al., Challenges Facing LGBT Youth, 17 GEO. J. GENDER & L.
125, 151–55 (2016) (discussing the “bullying, harassment, and violence” experienced by LGBT
youth).
282. See id. at 156 (discussing LGBT students’ potential legal recourse when outed by school
officials).
283. See Omar Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of Creepy: Technology, Privacy, and
Shifting Social Norms, 16 YALE J. L. & TECH. 59, 73 (2013).
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In an environment of rapidly shifting social norms and expectations,
the law can be a crude and belated tool. By the time the Supreme
Court decided that tracking a suspect with a GPS device required a
warrant, law enforcement authorities were already using drones. As
multiple circuits continue to debate the minutiae of law
enforcement’s access to email, users have migrated en masse to new
communication technologies such as instant messaging and VoIP.
The surge in innovation and socio-technological progress has left
entire industries drifting without clear ethical guidelines, as the law
fails to catch up with rampant technologies.284
Likely, the rapid development of student surveillance can be attributed to
this dearth of judicial precedent and statutes that specifically regulate the
ever-evolving set of surveillance technologies. School districts, eager to
do—or appear to be doing—everything they can to promote academic
success and student safety, seem to view the absence of laws clearly
proscribing or limiting use of a particular technology as permission to
proceed with its implementation.
Proceeding quickly, however, does have its costs. These may include
adverse legal rulings, when students and their families have the resources
and inclination to enforce the meager set of rights they do have. They also
may include negative publicity when surveillance violates privacy
expectations and social norms—even if not the law—and thus seems
“creepy.”285 Consider the following three examples.
First, when a school district’s zeal to investigate a student’s cell phone
outweighs careful consideration of countervailing constitutional principles,
the school may lose in court. In New Jersey v. T.L.O.,286 the touchstone case
for student searches, the Supreme Court endorsed a delinquency
adjudication of a student who was charged with drug offenses based on
items she had in her purse. 287 In ruling that the search and seizure of the
purse—conducted with neither a warrant nor probable cause—did not
offend the Fourth Amendment, the Court referenced the perceived link
between a school’s ability to have flexibility in administering discipline
and the maintenance of order and security. 288 The Court announced that
“reasonableness” would govern school searches, which is measured by
assessing, first, whether a search is justified at its inception, and second,
whether the search is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Id. (citations omitted).
See id.
469 U.S. 335 (1985).
See id. at 347–48.
See id. at 341.
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justifying the initial intrusion. 289 In its ruling, the Court specified that a
search could be countenanced by both suspected violations of the criminal
law and suspected infractions of school rules. 290
The breadth of the category that can justify the initial search,
combined with the low legal threshold of “reasonableness,” means that few
searches of a student’s personal possessions are found unconstitutional.291
Courts have upheld searches of students when they were sullen or
boisterous; unusually quiet or loud; fatigued or overactive; withdrawn or
excessively engaged with peers; disheveled or too neat.292 In sum, behavior
that is seemingly innocuous can justify the suspicion of a teacher or
administrator who can claim familiarity with a child. And a search
undertaken based on what in fact is nothing more than a lucky guess can be
found reasonable by reviewing courts given the fact that the mere suspicion
of a school-rule infraction can trigger the search in the first instance. 293
Warrants are required only when searches are conducted by outside law
enforcement.294
T.L.O. and its progeny might seem also to countenance warrantless
searches of student cell phones—notwithstanding the comparatively robust
Fourth Amendment protections that attach to cell phones and
smartphones—given the low “reasonableness” standard. 295 However, one
school district, even before the decision in Riley, was found to have
violated a student’s Fourth Amendment rights in the wake of a warrantless
cell phone search. 296 The student had a history of depression and marijuana
usage.297 He violated school policy regarding cell phone usage in the
classroom.298 Even taken together, however, the reviewing court deemed

289. Id. at 341–42 (following the twofold inquiry announced in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
20–21 (1967)).
290. Id. at 342.
291. See, e.g., Developments in the Law—Policing Students, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1747, 1761–
62 (2015) (“Even if there is a distinct special need to maintain school safety and order justifying
use of the balancing test, courts generally fail to accord proper weight to students’ privacy
interests and generally overvalue the government’s interests. The weight courts give to students’
privacy interests does not rely on or even consider the likely consequences of the search—school
discipline or criminal prosecution.”).
292. Martin H. Belsky, Random Versus Suspicion-Based Drug Testing in the Public Schools:
A Surprising Civil Liberties Dilemma, 27 OKLA. C ITY U. L. REV. 1, 19–21 (2002).
293. See Sarah Jane Forman, Countering Criminalization: Toward a Youth Development
Approach to School Searches, 14 SCHOLAR 301, 319–20 (2011) (“The problem is that reasonable
suspicion provides so much latitude for searching that school officials can construe almost
anything as reasonable.”).
294. See id. at 310–12.
295. See id. at 317.
296. G.C. v. Owensboro Pub. Sch., 711 F.3d 623, 634 (6th Cir. 2013).
297. Id. at 627.
298. Id. at 628.
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these factors insufficient to justify a search of the student’s phone; the court
ruled that the search exceeded the scope of the reason for the phone
seizure.299
Second, in a different district, school administrators installed video
cameras in a student locker room. 300 Upon an argument by a group of
parent plaintiffs that this installation violated the students’ Fourth
Amendment rights, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that this
specific kind of video surveillance was unconstitutional. 301 The court found
that while the safety rationale articulated by the school supported video
surveillance generally, it was insufficient to justify the specific and
particular intrusion into a locker room. 302 As in the pre-Riley student cell
phone case, the issue for the Sixth Circuit was one of scope:
A search—and there can be no dispute that videotaping students in a
school locker room is a search under the Fourth Amendment—is
‘permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably
related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in
light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction
as the commonly understood expectation for privacy increases, the
range and nature of permissible government intrusion decreases.
Given the universal understanding among middle school age
children in this country that a school locker room is a place of
heightened privacy, we believe placing cameras in such a way so as
to view the children dressing and undressing in a locker room is
incongruent to any demonstrated necessity, and wholly
disproportionate to the claimed policy goal of assuring increased
school security, especially when there is no history of any threat to
security in the locker rooms. 303
In other words, while safety concerns may generally countenance
surveillance, there are in fact legal constraints on indiscriminate placement
of surveillance devices, and in some cases the school will be held
accountable when it cannot actually demonstrate that safety concerns
justify a particular intrusion on a student’s privacy interests.304
Third, schools that adopt sophisticated technologies without full
awareness—or in disregard—of the technologies’ potential may incur
political blowback when the technologies cross a “creepy” line. 305 The

299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

Id. at 634.
Brannum v. Overton Cty. Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489, 492 (6th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 498.
Id.
Id. at 496, 498 (citation omitted).
Id. at 498.
See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
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following example from a Pennsylvania high school is illustrative. In the
early part of the last decade, the school installed webcams in school-issued
computers. Apparently unbeknownst to the school, the webcams could be
activated without the students’ knowledge, and they captured photographs
and screenshots of students at their homes, often in their bedrooms,
sometimes sleeping and frequently in states of undress.306 The school
claimed that it was using the technology only to track the computers in the
event that they were lost or stolen, yet it did not weigh these apparent
benefits against the serious privacy violations. 307 In a torrent of litigation
and bad publicity—a successful lawsuit by the families of several students
claiming tortious invasion of privacy and Fourth Amendment violations, a
federal criminal investigation, and Senator Arlen Spector calling the
program “surreptitious eavesdropping” during a Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee meeting308—the school discontinued the program.
III. TOWARD BETTER SURVEILLANCE POLICYMAKING
Teaching, by its nature, requires watching: ensuring that first graders
stay in their seats, that middle schoolers do not copy each other’s tests, and
that high schoolers do not leave school grounds without permission. 309 As
Bryan Warnick argues, to the extent that they merely enhance schools’
ability to be watchful, 310 many surveillance technologies may be
normatively unobjectionable.
The previous part identified ways, however, in which student
surveillance technologies and policies do something fundamentally
different in kind and degree from pre-digital age watchfulness. Namely,
these technologies infringe on important privacy interests of students in

306. See Complaint at 7, 14, Robbins v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., No. 10-665, 2010 WL
1957103 (E.D. Pa. May 14, 2010) (noting that “the webcam will capture anything happening in
the room in which the laptop computer is located, regardless of whether the student is sitting at
the computer and using it” and that the webcams captured students in various stages of undress).
307. Robert X. Cringley, When Schools Spy on Their Students, Bad Things Happen,
PCWORLD
(Feb.
23,
2010),
https://www.pcworld.com/article/190019/
school_spying_webcams.html [https://perma.cc/F5KX-VASJ]; Vince Lattanzio, WebcamGate
Teen:
“I
Hope
They’re
Not
Watching
Me,
NBC
(Feb.
2,
2010),
https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/tech/WebcamGate-Teen-I-Hope-Theyre-Not-WatchingMe-84826357.html [https://perma.cc/3BBS-MYDY] (discussing case).
308. Gregg Keizer, Pa. School Spy Case Sparks Fight Over Money, NETWORK WORLD (Mar.
19, 2010, 1:00 AM), https://www.networkworld.com/article/2204922/pa--school-spy-case-sparksfight-over-money.html [https://perma.cc/PS7G-PWQQ].
309. TUCKER & VANCE, supra note 44, at 3.
310. Warnick, supra note 113, at 329 (arguing that “it seems to make little ethical difference
if the watchfulness is aided by electronic tools”).
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ways that threaten to harm them in the short- and long-term. In addition,
the contemporary surveillance regime does not affect students equitably.311
Notwithstanding the above-cited examples of courts stepping in to
moderate the harm of surveillance technologies, it is nonetheless the case
that students, families, and public-school stakeholders must depend for the
most part on school districts to police themselves when it comes to
developing ethical, age-appropriate surveillance strategies. 312 The
following, non-exhaustive list is aimed at beginning a normative
conversation about the values that should inform student surveillance
policymaking.313
A.

Minimization

Among other features, the vast storage capacity of surveillance
technology renders it qualitatively different from in-person watching
during the pre-digital age. Digital educational technologies can maintain
student information for a long period of time.314 As such, they threaten to
preserve in perpetuity students’ often developmentally normative
misbehavior, 315 which presumably may be reviewed far in the future by a
potential employer, college, or graduate school. 316 This result severely
undermines some of the traditional aims of school, which include the
encouragement of intellectual risk-taking and forgiveness of misbehavior
that arises from immaturity and developmentally normative poor
judgment.317 For these reasons, school administrators should seek to
minimize their use of all surveillance technologies.
Minimization of surveillance technology has three additional benefits.
First, to the extent that pervasive surveillance conveys messages of
mistrust, those messages will be weakened. Second, surveillance
minimization helps students value their privacy; it sets a precedent for
students that surveillance is for particularized occasions and must be used

311. See supra Section II.C.
312. See Allen, supra note 241, at 733 (noting that surveillance “technology marches on” with
few constraints).
313. See Adam M. Samaha, What Good is the Social Model of Disability?, 74 U. CHI. L. REV.
1251, 1253 (2007) (discussing the fact that a normative orientation should guide policymakers as
they consider competing interests and confront questions of cost).
314. Elana Zeide, Education Technology and Student Privacy, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF CONSUMER PRIVACY 71, 77 (2018) (discussing storage capacity of educational
technology).
315. See supra note 207 and accompanying text (discussing the recognition, in the Supreme
Court case of Roper v. Simmons, that young people are categorically less culpable than adults
because they are impulsive, susceptible to peer pressure, and less able to weigh risk than adults).
316. See Zeide, Limits on Education, supra note 40, at 505–06.
317. Warnick, supra note 113, at 339.
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with care.318 Third, and finally, surveillance minimization empowers
students to practice autonomy—to use their educational experience to try
on new behaviors and identities toward an end of actualizing their right to
an open future. 319

B. Notice and Transparency
When the Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Schools district in North
Carolina rolled out its anonymous tip line, it did so in a way that seems
typical of most student surveillance—namely, with no meaningful notice.
In fact, the Director of School Safety informed students, staff, and families
of the implementation of the tip line in a short email—and only after the tip
line was already operational. 320 In response to a query about why parents
were not told—either in writing or at a school board meeting with
opportunity for discussion—about the tip line prior to its implementation,
the Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Schools Board Chair responded: “Thank you
for the message. This is an effort to increase safety at our schools and so
not necessarily part of a public process for feedback. The board and
administration has [sic] discussed questions of potential abuse and will
continue to monitor the process to minimize unintended consequences.” 321
This disregard for the value of notice seems to demonstrate a belief
either that students and parents do not care about surveillance or that they
do not deserve to be informed about it in advance. However, such a belief
runs counter to the Fair Information Practice principles, a set of aspirational
principles developed over the past fifty years used to model rules for

318. See supra Section II.B. (discussing pedagogical work of surveillance).
319. John Eekelaar, The Importance of Thinking that Children Have Rights, 6 INT’L J.L. &
FAM. 221, 229 (1992); Joseph Millum, The Foundation of the Child’s Right to an Open Future,
45 J. SOC. PHIL. 522, 522 (2014).
320. The email said:
Greetings CHCCS students, staff and families. As a school district and as a community,
we depend on students to “say something” if they notice anything in or around school
that looks like bullying, threats, drugs/alcohol or violence of any kind. To that end,
earlier today Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Schools rolled out a new anonymous reporting
option. This new Tipline allows students, parents or staff to anonymously submit any
sensitive or urgent student issue quickly to school officials at the touch of a button. The
Tipline link can be found on the front page of the new district website in the “Quick
Links” section (www.chccs.org) and on the front page of each individual school website.
It also can be accessed on the district app (search CHCCS in the App Store or Google
Play). Once a tip is submitted, administration will take appropriate action. All messages
submitted will remain completely anonymous.
Email from Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Schools to author (Sept. 26, 2018, 5:26 PM) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
321. E-mail from Rani Dasi, Chair of the Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Schools School Board, to
author (Oct. 2, 2018, 6:56 PM) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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responsible data practices. These principles enshrine the values of notice
and transparency. 322 Indeed, informing a public-school community about
surveillance serves several important goals. First, a policy of transparency
about surveillance permits students and families to protect their privacy
interests as much as possible, if doing so is important to them. Second, a
policy of transparency is critical to permit stakeholders to weigh in on
whether and how much schools should deploy tools of surveillance. Given
the costs and harms surveillance may produce, such a debate is critical.
Indeed, schools are public institutions and must be operated with some
degree of democratic accountability in the structuring of surveillance—
notice and transparency should be required. 323
C.

Deletion

Information obtained through surveillance should not be maintained
indefinitely. The “transcendence of time” 324 through storage increases the
likelihood that information gleaned about a particular student can be
obtained by non-educational entities and later used for non-educational
ends.325 A policy of regular and routine deletion of student information both
protects against the possibility of misuse and has an important signaling
function that student misbehavior is something from which one can learn
and out of which one can grow. 326
D.

Ongoing Recalibration of Benefits Versus Harms

Omar Tene and Jules Polonetsky propose that, given the pace of
technological innovation, individuals and institutions should engage in an
ongoing recalibration of privacy expectations and norms to make
determinations about whether and how much technology to use. 327 Such
recalibration is critical for educational surveillance policymaking.
For one, the nature and extent of threats to students changes over time.
The tools of surveillance should be proportional to the threats they are
designed to address, and they should be discontinued if they do not in fact
address those threats in some way. 328 Second, technologies may have
unanticipated harms, as in the case of the webcam in the school-issued

322. See Woodrow Hartzog, The Inadequate, Invaluable Fair Information Practices, 76 MD.
L. REV. 952, 952–53 (2017).
323. Warnick, supra note 113, at 339.
324. Id. at 333.
325. See supra notes 60–63, 264–66 and accompanying text.
326. Warnick, supra note 113, at 340.
327. Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 283, at 73.
328. Warnick, supra note 113, at 339.
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laptops in the Pennsylvania high school. 329 Thus, even when a technology
seems commensurate to a particular threat, its use may be so harmful that a
particular school district must find a different way to address it.
School districts demonstrate an understanding of the value to students
of being able to remove harmful data from their records. One North
Carolina school district, for example, permits expungement of certain
disciplinary data from student records.330 Just as school districts are willing
in some cases to jettison data that, on balance, they believe do more harm
than good, so too must districts be willing to abandon technologies when
the costs outweigh the benefits. 331
CONCLUSION
Scholars have established that the surveillance state has arrived, and
that the most interesting and important issues to be considered are its
normative content and scope. I have aimed to contribute to the discussion
of surveillance with three principal contributions: by providing a typology
of student surveillance technologies and policies; by analyzing the
competing considerations relevant surveillance that typically are not—but
should be—considered; and by offering preliminary thoughts on better
student surveillance policymaking.

329. See supra notes 305–08 and accompanying text.
330. Policy Code: 4345: Student Discipline Records, ASHEVILLE C ITY SCHS. (Oct. 3, 2011),
https://www.ashevillecityschools.net/site/handlers/filedownload.ashx?moduleinstanceid=216&dat
aid=1241&FileName=4345-Student-Discipline-Records.pdf. [https://perma.cc/4NHP-43MC].
331. For a thoughtful and related examination of how to weigh competing values surrounding
the use of police-generated digital video, see generally Richard E. Myers II, Police-Generated
Digital Video: Five Key Questions, Multiple Audiences, and a Range of Answers, 96 N.C. L. REV.
1237 (2018) (“Any well-crafted policy regarding digital video must have calibrated answers to
five key questions that arise as we consider the life cycle of the video: How will we handle (1)
creation, (2) storage, (3) access, (4) redaction, and (5) use of the digital video created by these
camera systems?”).
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